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ABSTRACT
FIXATION AND INCUBATION EFFECTS 
IN PROBLEM SOLVING
by
MARIE T. HANSBERRY 
University o f New Hampshire, December, 1998
In four experiments, the effects o f fixation and suppression processes in problem 
solving ability were investigated. Previous research has shown that efficient suppression 
mechanisms are integral to verbal ability (e.g., Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gernsbacher, 
Varner, & Faust, 1990; Hartman & Hasher, 1991). The present set o f experiments 
demonstrated that such a mechanism is also a component o f problem solving ability. The 
efficiency with which participants were able to suppress inappropriate meanings of 
ambiguous words was used as a measure o f suppression skill. Experiment 1 established 
that participants who were able to make use of previously-presented information to solve 
difficult insight problems were also more efficient at suppressing the inappropriate word 
meanings. Experiment 3 showed that participants who scored highly on the Remote 
Associates Test (RAT) were better able to suppress the inappropriate meanings, in 
comparison to low RAT solvers.
Experiments 1 -4  investigated fixation effects. Experiment 1 demonstrated that 
fixation to  incorrect responses on the insight problems is not easily attenuated when these 
incorrect responses have been generated by the subject. Experiment 2 showed that this
be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fixation effect is not attenuated even with the inclusion o f an incubation period between a 
first solution trial, in which the initial incorrect response is generated and a subsequent 
trial, in which the same problems are again presented, along with clues to solution.
Experiments 3 and 4 showed that fixation can be attenuated when initial incorrect 
solutions to RAT items are suggested by the experimenter. This is in contrast to 
Experiments 1 and 2, in which initial incorrect responses were generated by the 
participants. These attenuation effects were evidenced by increased solution rates to the 
RATs after an incubation period.
These experiments also investigated the degree to which individuals o f varying 
ability levels benefit from a period o f incubation. Previous research has shown mixed 
results in this regard. The present findings are also inconclusive. Experiment 3 showed 
that high-ability problem solvers benefited more from the incubation period than did low- 
ability problem solvers, while Experiment 4 revealed no differences in the incubation 
effects for individuals o f varying problem solving ability.
x
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INTRODUCTION
From the earliest days o f psychological research, investigators have speculated on 
the processes o f thinking and problem solving. These early approaches were dominated 
by two somewhat opposing approaches (see Newell & Simon, 1972 and Woodworth & 
Schlosberg, 19S4 for reviews). One, articulated notably by Thorndike (1898) attributed 
successful problem solving to a process o f trial and error, by which an animal or person 
finds solution to a problem by eliminating potential incorrect responses. Thorndike (1901) 
also concluded that while all o f the species that he tested used the same associative 
processes, some species such as monkeys, formed associations much more quickly than 
did the others. Altemativety, Kohler (192S) and other Gestalt psychologists alleged that 
problems are solved suddenly, after a restructuring o f the problem has taken place. An 
important distinction between the two theories is that solving problems by trial and error 
necessarily depends upon past experience, while the insight approach emphasizes the 
immediate circumstances, such as composition and organization o f the "problem field.”
Thorndike (1898) developed a number o f problems that embodied that concept of 
trial and error learning. According to  the trial and error framework, an animal has 
available to it a given set o f responses, and a variety of circumstances will influence 
response selection in any particular case. For example, when first placed in his "puzzle 
box," Thorndike's cats tried many diffuse struggling responses, such as clawing, pulling, 
and kicking in attempting to escape the box. Escape was possible when the animal came
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2upon the necessary response. Importantly, Thorndike noted that the responses made by 
the cats were not indiscriminant, but were similar to the types o f behaviors that had 
previously resulted in escape from enclosed places. This is supported by his observation 
that the cats did not emit every possible behavior, but rather confined their attention to the 
slots and moving parts o f the box, which previously proved successful in similar situations. 
Further, when Thorndike (1911) made escape from the puzzle box contingent upon non- 
stereotypical "escape" responses, such as licking, he found that the cats took far longer to 
emit the correct response. He concluded that such responses were not transferred to the 
puzzle box situation because they were not within the animal's repertoire o f likely escape 
solutions.
Kohler (1925), working with chimpanzees and other apes, presented his subjects 
with a series o f novel problems, one o f which was retrieving bananas that were outside o f 
the reach o f a caged chimpanzee. Available to the chimp were two sticks, both o f which 
were too short to reach the bananas. According to  Kohler, the chimps initially tried to use 
each stick to  retrieve the bananas. When this approach proved unsuccessful, the chimps 
stopped working on the problem for a period o f time before making the sudden 
realization that the sticks could be pushed together to create a tool o f sufficient length to 
accomplish the task. Kohler maintained that it was not simply the past history o f stick use 
that triggered solutions, but rather a restructuring o f the problem that led to an immediate 
solution.
Subsequent research, however, has proven, whatever the merits o f Kohler's 
arguments about "insight," that prior experience plays an important role in problem
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3solving. Birch (1945) showed that solutions to the Kohler problems were dependent upon 
the past history o f the chimps. He presented the banana problem to  chimps that were 
raised in captivity and therefore had no past experience with using sticks as tools. Birch 
found that none o f the chimps was able to  solve the problem. However, all o f the chimps 
solved the problem easily after they were provided with the opportunity to play with 
similar sticks on several occasions. Birch concluded that past experience is a necessary 
requisite to solving novel problems.
Recent research with humans draws similar conclusions (e.g., Weisberg, 1993; 
Weisberg & Alba, 1981). There can be no doubt that prior experience plays a crucial role 
in any account o f problem solving. Immediately antecedent experiences have been shown 
to both facilitate solutions, in studies o f transfer (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983;
Maier, 1931) and hinder or block solutions, in studies o f fixation (e.g., Duncker, 1945; 
Luchins, 1942). And o f course, the participants in these experiments bring a long history 
o f experience to the laboratory that can be summarized in so-called subject variables, such 
as intelligence, age, flexibility o f thought, expertise, ability to suppress extraneous 
information, and motivation. While these variables might be referred to as subject 
variables, because they describe attributes that one brings to a problem solving situation, 
researchers have also been interested in ways in which the problem solving situation can 
be experimentally manipulated. For example, the mathematical problems used by Luchins 
(1942) served to direct solvers to a particular rule for obtaining the desired quantities. 
Other such manipulations have included varying instructions, presenting extraneous 
information along with the problem to be solved, providing participants with clues to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
solving problems, and introducing varying time delays ("incubation" periods) between 
successive solution attempts.
The research reported in this dissertation looks at human problem solving within 
this broad trial and error framework. It should be noted that more modern conceptions o f 
problem solving describe the process as a search through "problem space" (Newell & 
Simon, 1972). The problem space includes the presented problem and the goal, as well as 
the problem solver's knowledge. Thus, this conceptualization is functionally equivalent to 
the trial and error terminology. The problems used are traditional ones o f a verbal nature 
and presuppose that individuals do have the appropriate responses within their verbal 
repertoire. They are among those that Newell and Simon (1972) called well-defined 
problems, given that the parameters are clearly specified and there is a specific goal, or 
solution, to each problem. The overall objective o f my project is to examine the 
interrelationship o f several experimental manipulations, as well as certain subject variables, 
on problem solutions. Details o f the factors relevant to  this dissertation will be considered 
in the following chapters.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I
PROBLEM SOLVING
This chapter provides a review o f research relevant to the problems and 
methodologies used in the present set o f experiments. These include conceptual transfer, 
insight riddles, and the Remote Associates Test. Subsequent chapters outline the variables 
that are used to predict success on these types o f problems.
Conceptual Transfer
Conceptual transfer involves the access o f relevant knowledge to solve problems. 
A number o f investigations o f this issue have demonstrated that problem solvers fail to 
spontaneously transfer available information to new situations (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 
1980; Needham & Begg, 1991; Perfetto, Bransford & Franks, 1983; Ross, Ryan, & 
Tenpenny, 1989; Weisberg, DiCammilo, & Phillips, 1978). Many o f these studies have 
used problems similar to those developed by German psychologist, Karl Duncker, who in 
1945 demonstrated that solvers will proceed through a series o f steps when working out 
the solutions to the difficult problems with which he presented them. Two o f his scenarios 
have become classics in the problem solving literature.
The first is the candle problem, in which participants were presented with the task 
o f finding a way to mount a candle to a wall, using only the candle, a box o f matches, and 
some nails. He found that participants were generally unable to solve the problem, which
5
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6involved dumping the matches from the box, nailing the box to the wall, and using the 
matches to light the candle until there was enough wax to mount the candle in the box. 
Duncker referred to the inability to  solve this problem as "functional fixedness," or the 
idea that we generally think o f only the customary use for a particular object, and 
therefore, not the novel use that is necessary to solve this type o f problem. In this case 
one must conceptualize using the box as a holder for the candle, rather than as a container 
(CHucksberg & Weisberg, 1966).
The second o f Duncker's problems is the radiation problem. In this problem, 
participants read a story that described a cancer procedure in which a tumor had to be 
destroyed with radiation. The caveat was that the amount o f radiation passing through the 
healthy tissue on the way to the tumor would destroy these cells as well. Participants 
were asked to devise a way that the tumor could be destroyed, while leaving the 
surrounding tissue unharmed. The correct solution was to attack the tumor with smaller 
doses o f radiation, from a number o f points, thereby administering the required dosage to 
destroy the cancer, while leaving the healthy tissue intact. Again, Duncker found that 
participants were very unlikely to solve this problem.
Gick and Holyoak (1980) and Weisberg et al. (1978) revisited Duncker's problems, 
and provided clues to solving them. Weisberg et al. presented the candle problem. Prior 
to being faced with this problem, participants were given the task o f memorizing a series 
o f paired associates. For experimental groups, one of these pairs was, "candle-box." 
Results showed that these participants were no more likely to solve the candle problem 
than controls who memorized the pair, "candle-paper.” Only a second experimental
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7group, who were given the hint that one o f the previously-memorized pairs would be 
helpful to solution, were able to solve the problem. Weisberg et al. concluded that simply 
possessing relevant information is not sufficient for effective solution, but that one must 
also realize that the information is relevant.
Similarly, Gick and Holyoak (1980) administered the radiation problem. Before 
being presented with this problem, participants read a similar problem in which a farmer 
was faced with the dilemma o f providing a large amount o f water to his crops, without 
creating erosion problems by having too much water going through his field via any one 
pathway. The farmer had the idea o f providing several small irrigation systems to the 
field, thereby sparing the flooding that would be caused over just one path. Surprisingly, 
Gick and Holyoak's participants did not spontaneously use the information from the 
farmer problem to solve the radiation problem, although the time between presentation of 
the two problems was only several minutes. When they were instructed to use the farmer 
information, nearly all o f the participants solved the problem.
Other research has shown that solvers will transfer, but again, only if they are 
explicitly instructed to do so (e.g., Landrum, 1990; Perfetto et al., 1983; Ross et al., 1989; 
Spencer & Weisberg, 1986; Stein, Way, Benningfield, & Hedgecough, 1986; Weisberg et 
al., 1978). Perfetto et al. presented a series o f statements about a specific protagonist or 
object. An example is, NA man who lived in a small town in the U.S. married 20 different 
women o f the same town. All are still living and he has never divorced any o f them. Yet, 
he has broken no law. Can you explain?" In some conditions, the statements were 
proceeded by a clue statement. In this example the clue was, "A minister marries several
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8people each week." This statement was intended to provide participants with the 
information necessary to solve the problem. These clue sentences were presented in the 
initial part of the experiment. As an orienting task, the participants were asked to judge 
the sentences according to their truthfulness. In the subsequent problem solving phase, 
participants in the informed group were told that the acquisition sentences would help 
them to solve the problems, while the uninformed group was not given this hint.
Consistent with Gick and Holyoak's (1980) results, participants did not solve these 
problems spontaneously. That is, they did not transfer the clue information to solve the 
puzzle unless they were explicitly told to do so.
Fixation Effects in Transfer Paradigms 
A secondary finding by Perfetto et al. (1983) was that participants who initially had 
been uninformed o f the necessity to transfer the clue information to solve the puzzles were 
often still unable to solve the same problems on a second trial, when they were given these 
instructions. However, they were able to use this clue information to solve puzzles 
presented on this trial that they had not previously seen. In this procedure the participants 
who had originally been in the uninformed group were retested. This time, they were 
informed o f the relationship between the clue statements and the puzzles. They were 
again presented with the original puzzles to solve, as well as some new puzzles that had 
not been included in the first trial. The clue statement contained a relevant clue for each 
o f these puzzles.
Perfetto et al. (1983) found that participants solved the new problems, but that
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9they continued to experience difficulty in solving the problems that they had received in 
the first trial. The authors concluded that participants were unable to solve the original 
problems in the second session because they had previously generated their own responses 
to these puzzles, which they continued to think were appropriate even after they were 
informed o f the correct response. It should be mentioned that each o f the puzzles could 
have one or more plausible, though incorrect, solutions that were not the responses that 
were supplied by the experimenter. For example, the minister puzzle might suggest the 
conclusion that the man was a bigamist living in Utah, although this possibility was ruled 
out in the puzzle. Further, the participants were informed that the clues supplied in the 
first part o f the experiment were appropriate for solving the puzzles.
Perfetto et al. (1983) concluded that the participants encoded the wrong responses 
on the first reading o f the puzzles, and retrieved these responses during the second 
reading. This conclusion is supported by the finding that the participants did use the 
supplied clues to  solve the new puzzles in the second trial. Therefore, the clues were 
available to participants, but the inability to make use o f them was limited to the riddles 
for which incorrect responses had already been generated. This item-specific fixation has 
been replicated in subsequent work with the same riddle materials (Adams, Kasserman, 
Yearwood, Perfetto, Bransford, & Franks, 1988; Perfetto, Yearwood, Franks, & 
Bransford, 1987).
In a follow-up study, Perfetto et al. (1987) tested their conclusion that the process 
o f generating solutions to the riddles interfered with the access o f the relevant acquisition 
sentence when solving on Trial 2. In this experiment, the "generate" group attempted to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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solve the riddles on Trial 1, while the "read" simply read the riddles, which were 
accompanied by the solutions o f a yoked participant in the generate condition. Both 
groups attempted to use the acquisition sentences to solve the riddles on Trial 2. Results 
showed that generate group solved relatively fewer o f the "old” riddles on Trial 2 than did 
the read group. This supports Perfetto et al.'s (1983) earlier theory that Trial 1 solution 
attempts interfered with accessing o f the acquisition sentences for "old" riddles on Trial 2.
Other researchers (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Ross, 1984; Ross & Kennedy, 1990) have 
made similar claims. For example, Ross & Kennedy forwarded a theory o f "reminding" 
that is specific to problem solving. This theory states that we solve problems through a 
process o f reminding, by which we automatically access previous information that shares 
features with the problem to  be solved. With regard to Perfetto et al.'s (1983) findings, it 
is possible that when participants attempt to solve the same riddles on Trial 2, they are 
reminded of their first solution attempt, which includes their original incorrect responses. 
Therefore, these incorrect responses block the access to the appropriate clue information.
While much literature has focused on a general lack o f spontaneous transfer, other 
research has shown evidence for transfer in some participants. The following section 
entails a discussion o f studies that have identified certain attributes o f problem solvers who 
are able to successfully transfer relevant information when faced with a novel problem.
Spontaneous Transfer and Problem Solving Ability 
The previous section outlined several studies demonstrating that simply possessing 
necessary information is not sufficient to  facilitate problem solving, but that participants
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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must also recognize that this information is relevant to the problem (Perfetto et al., 1983; 
Stein et al., 1986). These studies have shown that participants are very unlikely to 
spontaneously access the relevant information. However, there has been little research to 
investigate the characteristics o f the small number o f solvers who do exhibit spontaneous 
transfer (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Lockhart, Lamon, & Gick, 1988; Novick, 1988; 
Spencer & Weisberg, 1986; Stein et al., 1986).
Gick and Holyoak (1983) presented two stories that were very similar in structure 
to  the radiation problem. Participants first read each story and summarized it. They were 
then asked to describe how the two stories shared similarities. Participants were then 
presorted with the radiation problem. As in the other studies o f transfer, some 
participants were instructed that the previously-presented stories would aid in solving the 
radiation problem, while others were not informed o f this relationship. Results showed 
that the informed group had higher solution rates than uninformed group. However, 
within both groups there was a relationship between the quality of the description o f 
similarity between the two initial problems and the likelihood o f solving the radiation 
problem. For example, in the uninformed group, 90% o f the participants who provided a 
high-quality similarity description produced a solution to the radiation problem. A high- 
quality description was one that described ways in which the two problems shared 
structural similarities. These included a goal o f a  large quantity of something reaching a 
particular central location, the limitation that all o f the force could not be delivered along 
the same route, and a solution that involved breaking the total force into smaller quantities 
that met at the desired location. This was referred to as the convergence solution.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Gick and Holyoak (1983) concluded that one aspect of being a good problem 
solver is the ability to "see" the structural similarities between analogous problems. 
Subsequently, Holyoak and colleagues (e.g., Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989) 
have formulated the pragmatic schema model o f analogical transfer, which states that 
successful problem solvers develop an abstract schema for working out problems o f a 
similar nature. In the case o f the Gick and Holyoak results, individuals who developed an 
appropriate schema for comparing the two example problems were able to  utilize that 
schematic information and appropriately transfer it to solve the radiation problem. This 
"appropriate schema” involved recognizing the underlying structural similarities between 
the two examples. In contrast, poor problem solvers, those who did not spontaneously 
transfer solution to the radiation problem, focused on the surface similarities between the 
two example problems.
Other researchers (e.g., Chen, 1995; Chen, Yanowitz, & Daehler, 1995; Chi, 
Fehovich, & Glaser, 1981; Novick, 1988) have forwarded similar theories that apply to 
various domains o f problem solving. These theories share the basic supposition that 
expert problem solvers focus on structural similarities between analogous problems in 
various domains, while novice problem solvers focus on surface similarities. For example, 
Chi et al. showed this effect in physics experts and novices.
Accessing Remote Associates in Problem Solving
Another common task that has been used to  measure problem solving performance 
is the Remote Associates Test (RAT), which involves a series o f items, each made up of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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three words that are related to each other in some way. The task is to determine the 
common bond between the three words. An example is this: SNOW, DOWN, OUT. This 
would require a response o f "fall", since each test word goes with "fell," (i.e., snowfall, 
downfall, fell out). The solution to each o f these items is a word that has only a weak 
connection to each o f the three words; that is, the solution is remotely associated to each 
o f the words. Therefore, in order to solve each item, it is necessary to look beyond the 
dominant meaning o f each o f the three words, and focus on the less-dominant meaning 
that is somehow remotely associated to  the other words via its connection to a fourth 
word.
Mednick (1962) devised the RAT as a measure o f creativity. He believed that 
people who are able to make these remote associates should also be more creative in 
general because, according to Mednick's conceptualization o f creativity, a creative process 
is one that makes use o f novel solutions to situations. While the RAT was conceptualized 
by Mednick as a measure o f creativity, its usefulness as a predictor of this ability has been 
limited (Andrews, 1975; see Nickerson, 1985 for a review). However, the RAT has 
proven to be a reliable indicator o f verbal ability (Katz, 1983), making it suitable for use 
as a measure o f verbal problem solving.
Simonton (1988) forwarded a theory o f creative problem solving that is modeled 
after Mednick's work. This theory states that original ideas result from the random 
combination o f remotely-associated ideas. In Simonton's view, successful problem solvers 
possesses a "looser" set o f connections between concepts than do less creative people and 
are therefore less rigidly bound to systematic associations. Simonton hypothesized that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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this flexibility o f thought allowed such a problem solver to access the necessary solution to 
the RAT because it is possible to  look beyond the dominant meanings o f the words 
comprising the RAT items.
From the above discussion, it is possible to draw a connection between ability on 
the RAT and performance on the riddles that were described previously. In both cases, it 
is necessary for the solver to "look beyond" the dominant meanings o f concepts and make 
use o f the less obvious meanings to solve the problem at hand. For example, in order to 
solve the "minister" problem, one must look ignore the dominant meaning o f "marry," that 
is, to be wed, and instead access the less common meaning, to perform a marriage 
ceremony. Similarly, to solve a RAT item, it is necessary to attend to the less common 
meaning o f the three RAT words. The current set o f experiments includes an attempt to 
relate the skill to solve RAT items to the ability to solve the previously-described riddles.
It is expected that these abilities are positively correlated.
In general, researchers have claimed that good problem solvers, and more 
specifically, successful transfers, possess specific skills, such as the ability to recognize 
structural similarities between similar types o f problems, and the ability for non-rigid 
thinking. The current dissertation includes an investigation o f another characteristic o f 
participants who possess high problem solving ability. This trait, the ability to suppress 
extraneous information, is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER II
INTERFERENCE AND SUPPRESSION
This section will provide an overview o f the literature and theories regarding the 
role o f suppression efficiency in comprehension skill. Previous researchers have shown 
that suppression ability is integral to certain cognitive skills, such as verbal comprehension. 
The present dissertation extends this work to  investigate the impact o f suppression skill on 
problem solving ability.
The Stroop Task
Much o f the research on interference effects in cognitive processes stems from the 
early work of J. R. Stroop (1935), who demonstrated that the time necessary to name the 
colors o f words could be affected by the meanings o f the words. Stroop required 
participants to quickly name the ink color in which words were printed. The words 
themselves were color names (e.g., the word, "red" printed in green ink). Stroop found 
that reading times were longer if the words and the ink colors were incompatible. He 
concluded that participants experienced interference from the word meanings when trying 
to name the ink colors.
Performance on Stroop-like tasks has long been used as a measure o f reading 
ability in children (e.g., Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962; Merrill, Sperber, & McCauley, 
1981; Rosinski, Golinkoflf & Kukish, 1975). These studies have demonstrated that
15
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children suffer the greatest interference on this task just after they have learned to read. 
Performance then improves and stabilizes in early adulthood. A decrease in performance, 
that is, an increase in the interference effect on the Stroop task, is evidenced in late 
adulthood (Hasher, Stoitzfus, Zacks, & Rympa, 1991; McDowd & Oseas-Kreger, 1991).
Negative Priming
In 1966, Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr provided an interesting extension o f the 
Stroop Effect. Participants were presented with the Stroop Task, as described above. 
However, in this experiment, each word was the name o f the following color on the list. 
For example, BLUE printed in yellow ink was followed by RED printed in blue ink, then 
GREEN printed in red ink, etc. In this way, participants had to name the ink color for the 
word that they had ignored on the previous trial. Results showed that the time necessary 
to name the ink colors on this task was even slower than on the standard Stroop Task. 
Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr concluded that participants had to suppress the name o f 
each word in order to name the ink color. Therefore, when the just-suppressed word had 
to be activated to name the following ink color, the response times were longer, in 
comparison to trials when the ink color was unrelated to the previous word.
Tipper (1985) originated the term, "negative priming," to describe this effect. He 
defined negative priming as the increase in response time as a result o f a prior presentation 
o f the target, compared to  a condition in which the target had not previously been 
presented and ignored. This can be compared to priming, in which response times to  just- 
attended stimuli are facilitated. Tipper and colleagues (e.g., Tipper, 1985; Tipper &
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Cranston, 1985) provided evidence for this effect in a series of experiments.
Tipper and Cranston (1985) presented participants with a series o f superimposed 
letters. One set o f the letters was printed in red ink and the other set was printed in green 
ink. The required task was to read the red letters out loud while ignoring the green letters. 
The measurement o f interest was the time necessary to  read a control condition in which 
only the red target letters were presented, versus the time taken to read the ignored prime 
condition, which consisted o f target letters that had been presented as distractors on the 
previous trial. That is, the red letters on this trial were the green letters on the previous 
trial. If  participants were successful inhibitors, then they would experience difficulty 
naming the targets on the ignored prime condition. Results supported these predictions.
Subsequently, researchers have shown negative priming effects in many other 
selective-attention tasks, such as picture naming (Tipper, 1985), semantic categorization 
(Tipper & Driver, 1988), and counting (Driver & Tipper, 1989). Researchers have also 
used the Tipper task to investigate the role o f inhibition skills in older adults' diminished 
abilities in divided attention tasks (e.g., McDowd & Oseas-Kreger, 1991). These 
researchers demonstrated negative priming in younger adults, but a lack o f negative 
priming in the older adults. These results are taken as evidence for the Inhibition 
Hypothesis forwarded by Hasher and Zacks (1988), which states that older adults suffer a 
loss o f inhibition abilities, and that this loss is the basis for older adults' diminished 
performance in selective attention tasks. Gernsbacher and colleagues (e.g., Gernsbacher, 
1990; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991: Gernsbacher, Varner, & Faust, 1990) have formalized 
a theory o f comprehension that builds upon this work on interference. This work is
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Suppression and the Structure Building Framework
In a series o f experiments, Gernsbacher and colleagues (Gernsbacher et al., 1990; 
Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991) demonstrated that low-skilled readers perform at lower levels 
than high-skilled readers in a number o f cognitive tests. These tasks included the ability to 
suppress information that was initially accessed during comprehension, but that was 
subsequently shown to be unrelated to the context o f the material. Reading skill was 
measured by the Multi-Media Comprehension Battery (Gernsbacher & Varner, 1988).
This battery consists o f six stories, two o f which are presented in written form, two in 
spoken form, and two in the form o f nonverbal pictures. After reading each story, the 
participants were asked twelve questions about the story. Gernsbacher and Varner found 
that comprehension scores on the written and oral sections were highly correlated with 
comprehension o f the nonverbal stories. Therefore, they have concluded that these skills 
may be grouped together into what they called a "general comprehension skill." Based on 
their overall findings, the researchers concluded that general comprehension skill includes 
the ability to comprehend both linguistic and nonlinguistic information.
Additionally, Gernsbacher et al. (1990) devised a theory o f memory that they 
termed the Structure Building Framework. According to this framework, there are several 
processes involved in the construction o f mental representations that are necessary for 
comprehension. During comprehension, memory nodes are activated by incoming 
information. Once activated, these memory nodes will further transmit information
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concerning the processing o f the information. Two mechanisms in this system, 
enhancement and suppression, control the activation level o f the memory cells. When the 
information transmitted by the memory nodes is relevant to the structure that is currently 
being built, enhancement serves to  increase the level o f activation o f those nodes. 
Analogously, when the information is not useful for the structure, the suppression 
mechanism serves to decrease the activation level o f those nodes. Further, Gernsbacher et 
al. claim that enhancement and suppression are not limited to language production, but 
that they are general cognitive mechanisms that are involved in the structure building o f 
nonlinguistic tasks as well.
These researchers provided evidence for such a framework. For example, 
Gernsbacher et al. (1990) showed that low-skilled readers demonstrated a deficient ability 
to suppress the inappropriate meaning o f ambiguous words. High- and low-skilled readers 
were presented with sentences that ended with ambiguous words. An example of such a 
sentence is as follows: "He dug with the spade" (or, "He dug with the shovel"). In the 
first sentence, "spade” is ambiguous because it might refer to either a garden tool or to a 
playing card. After reading each sentence, a test word was presented. In this example, 
the test word was "ACE." The task was to decide whether or not the test word fit the 
meaning of the sentence. The test word was presented at two intervals, either immediately 
(100 ms) after the presentation o f the sentence, or 850 ms after the sentence. At the 100 
ms interval, both high- and low-skilled readers had equal difficulty rejecting the test word 
that corresponded to the inappropriate meaning o f the target word, suggesting that both 
groups o f readers accessed both the context-appropriate meaning, as well as the
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context-inappropriate meaning. However, at the 850 ms interval, only the low-skilled 
readers demonstrated this difficulty. Based on these findings, Gernsbacher et al. 
concluded that low-skilled readers are less able to suppress the inappropriate meanings of 
ambiguous words.
Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) extended these findings to other tasks, both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic. For example, in a linguistic task, they showed that low-skilled 
readers are less efficient at suppressing the inappropriate forms o f homophones. The 
procedure was similar to that used by Gernsbacher et al. (1990). Readers were presented 
with sentences that ended with a word that was a homophone. For example, they read 
"He had lots o f patients." The test word, "CALM" was not related to this word, but it 
was related to the other member o f the homophone pair, "patience," which was never 
actually presented. Gernsbacher and Faust compared response times to  reject test words 
from these sentences, versus the time to reject the word after reading control sentences 
with non-homophone final words, (e.g., "He had lots o f students"). The difference 
between these two decision times showed the amount o f activation for the incorrect form 
o f the homophone. Again, the results showed that both the high- and low-skilled readers 
had high activation o f the incorrect homophone after 100 ms, but only low-skilled readers 
showed continued activation after a one-second interval.
O f particular importance to the proposed set o f experiments, Gernsbacher and 
Faust (1991) have shown that suppression o f inappropriate schematic information is also a 
critical aspect in comprehending nonlinguistic information. They based their research on 
previous work that has shown that participants will access and use schematic information
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when making judgments about objects in a scene that depicts a common venue, such as a 
farm or an office (e.g., Biederman, Bickle, Teiteibaum, & Klatsky, 1988; Brewer & 
Treyens, 1981). Biederman et al. presented participants with pictures o f objects that 
might typically appear in a particular situation. One group o f objects included things that 
might be found on a farm. Another group included common items that one might 
encounter in a kitchen. Participants were then presented with a single picture o f an item. 
The required task was to report whether or not the given object had appeared in the 
original scene. Biederman et al. found that the participants were more likely to incorrectly 
report that a item that is common to the original scene, but that had not been presented in 
the scene, had actually been presented. For example, participants were more likely to 
incorrectly report that a tractor had been presented in the farm scene than in the kitchen 
scene.
Similarly, Brewer and Treyens (1981) found that participants recalled objects that 
were consistent with their schema for a situation, even if the object had not been presented 
to them. These researchers asked participants who arrived for their experiment to wait in 
an office, supposedly waiting for the experiment to be set up in another room. After a 
brief period, participants were taken to another room and asked to recall as many o f the 
objects as they could that were in the office where they had been waiting. Brewer and 
Treyens found that participants were most likely to  remember the objects that were 
consistent with their "office schema." That is, they remembered seeing the desk and chair, 
but were less likely to recall the coffee pot or wine bottle. Also, many o f the participants 
remembered having seen objects that had not been in the room, but that would be
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consistent with the schema for an office, such as books. Both Biederman et al. (1988) and 
Brewer and Treyens interpreted their results as evidence for the activation o f a particular 
schema when that schema is appropriate.
Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) have reanalyzed Biederman et al.'s (1988) results, 
using a suppression paradigm. They reasoned that low-skilled readers should suppress the 
distractor stimuli less efficiently than the high-skilled readers should, if the suppression 
mechanism that controls linguistic information is the same mechanism that controls 
nonlinguistic information. Gernsbacher and Faust conducted a partial replication o f the 
Biederman et al. study, with the addition o f a suppression measure. They measured the 
time that participants took to reject the distractor items when these items were likely to be 
found in the scenario (e.g., the time taken to reject "tractor" when it had not actually been 
presented in a farm scene) versus the time necessary to  reject the distractor item when it 
was not common to the previously viewed scene (e.g., when the distractor item was 
"tractor” and the scene had been a kitchen scene). The difference between these two 
response times was the measure o f the activation o f the common distractor item. 
Gernsbacher and Faust found that both high- and low-skilled readers demonstrated high 
activation o f the common distractors when the test was given SO ms after the viewing of 
the scene. However, only the low-skilled readers showed continued activation one second 
after viewing the scene. Gernsbacher and Faust concluded that the low-skilled readers 
have less efficient mechanisms in place for these nonlinguistic tasks, as well as for the 
linguistic tasks. Further, they concluded that a single mechanism underlies both o f the 
task types.
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To summarize, Gernsbacher and colleagues have concluded that a general 
cognitive mechanism is responsible for their varied findings. They suggested that this 
general mechanism might underlie the deficits that the low-skilled readers have been 
shown to display. The present set o f experiments will investigate the role that such a 
mechanism might play in problem solving ability.
The impetus for extending Gernsbacher et al.'s (1990) research to problem solving 
comes from three sources. The first is Gernsbacher et al.'s claim o f a general cognitive 
mechanism, as described above. I f  as the researchers claim, suppression efficiency is 
integral to cognitive ability in general, then poor problem solvers should demonstrate 
reduced suppression efficiency in comparison to  more successful problem solvers. A 
related source is research involving reading skills in children (e.g., Fowles & Glanz, 1976; 
Merrill et al., 1981; Yuill & Oakhill, 1991), which is discussed below. The third source is 
the literature on the relationship between problem solving skill and tendency for 
conceptual transfer in problem solving (Novick, 1988; Stein et al., 1988). The first and 
last o f these issues have already been addressed. The second source is the topic o f the 
next section.
Developmental Research
As mentioned previously, performance on Stroop-like tasks has been used as a 
measure o f reading ability in children (e.g., Comalli, et al., 1962; Merrill et al., 1981; 
Rosinski & Golinkoff 1976). For example, Morrill et al. (1981) presented skilled and less 
skilled fifth grade comprehenders with a modified Stroop task. This involved reading one
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sentence at a time and then naming the color o f a target word that appeared immediately 
(one second) after the sentence was removed. The target word was appropriate, 
inappropriate, or neutral with regard to  the meaning o f the sentence. One set o f sentences 
was:
Appropriate meaning: The man moved the piano.
Inappropriate meaning: The man played the piano.
Neutral: The girl watched the rain.
In this example, the target word was HEAVY. Results showed that skilled 
readers exhibited interference in color naming when the target word was contextually 
related to the sentence, compared to the time required to name the color o f the target 
word when that word was inappropriate with regard to sentence meaning. In this 
example, skilled readers responded more slowly to HEAVY when it followed, "The man 
moved the piano," than when it followed, "The man played the piano." However, the less 
skilled comprehenders did not show this pattern. These individuals exhibited interference 
when the target word was related to the contextually inappropriate sentence. That is, the 
naming times for the target word following the two semantically similar sentences did not 
differ for the less skilled comprehenders. In contrast, the skilled comprehenders 
responded as quickly to the target word when it was related to the contextually 
inappropriate meaning o f the sentence as they did when the sentence was neutral with 
regard to the target word.
Merrill et al. (1981) also measured color naming time latency following single 
word contexts. In this procedure, participants read only the sentence final word (SFW)
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for each experimental sentence before naming the same target word. For example, they 
read either the word, "piano," o r "rain," and then named the color o f the target word that 
followed. Results for this single-word context showed a different pattern. Both the 
skilled and less skilled comprehenders displayed interference from the related SFW, 
compared to the neutral word.
Taken together, the results o f the sentence condition and the word condition 
demonstrate that poor comprehenders process sentences differently than good 
comprehenders. Specifically, it is suggested that poor comprehenders process sentences in 
much the same way that they process single words, while good comprehenders form a 
better representation of the sentence meaning, which necessarily includes disregarding 
word information that is not useful to maintaining the overall meaning o f the sentence.
Put another way, poor comprehenders do not make efficient use o f things such as context 
in processing individual words in a sentence. Merrill et al. (1981) concluded that the poor 
comprehenders are more bound to the surface features of sentences, such as the exact 
wording o f the sentences. Evidence for this claim lies in the finding that the poor 
comprehenders processed the words similarly, regardless of whether the word was 
presented in isolation or as part o f a sentence context. Further, Gernsbacher et al. (1991) 
argued that such results can be attributed to the poor comprehenders being unable to 
suppress the inappropriate meaning o f the SFW, such as PIANO, even when the context 
does not suggest that meaning.
A related line of work revealed that children (mean age = 8 years) who were 
identified as poor comprehenders were less able to understand puns containing ambiguous
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words (Yuill & Oakhill, 1991). For example, the children heard riddles such as, "How do 
you know there was fruit on Noah's Ark? ...because the animals came in pairs." The 
poor comprehenders had difficulty understanding such riddles, as measured by their ability 
to retell the riddles and explain why they were funny. However, these children performed 
as well as good comprehenders in a test that measured their ability to understand 
ambiguous words. In this test, the children were presented with a word orally and asked 
to give two different definitions o f the word. One example was, pear-pair. Yuill and 
Oakhill concluded it was not a matter o f the poor comprehenders being less able to notice 
the ambiguities, but rather, it might be that the poor comprehenders were less able to 
determine which meaning was appropriate in the context o f the pun.
There is a similarity in this work with children and in Gernsbacher et al.'s (1990) 
findings with adults, in that both lines o f research have shown that the Iow-ability 
comprehenders are not simply less able to understand the various meanings o f the words 
that they encounter. Therefore, Gernsbacher et al.'s conclusion o f an inefficient 
suppression might be applicable to the Yuill and Oakhill (1991) findings. Gernsbacher and 
Robertson (1995) claim that the poor comprehenders in this study do access both 
meanings o f the ambiguous word, but are then unable to decide which one is appropriate 
for making sense o f the information at hand.
Gernsbacher (1994) conducted a follow-up the Merrill et al. (1981) study, using an 
adult population. As in previous work, participants were divided into high- and low- 
skilled comprehenders based on their performance on the Multi-Media Battery 
(Gernsbacher & Varner, 1988). Participants read one o f three prime sentences that ended
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in a homophone. They then read a target sentence that was paired with the prime 
sentence. An example is below:
Prime sentences: SAME meaning: She lit the match.
NEUTRAL meaning: She saw the match.
DIFFERENT meaning: She won the match.
Target sentence: She blew out the match.
After reading each sentence, participants decided whether or not the sentence 
made sense by responding yes or no. Response times o f interest were those to the target 
sentences after reading neutral prime sentences, in comparison to after reading same 
meaning primes or different meaning primes. Results showed that both high- and low- 
skilled comprehenders experienced relative benefits from the same meaning primes. This 
is shown by decreased response times to the target sentences after participants read the 
same meaning primes. However, only the high-skilled comprehenders experienced costs 
from the different meaning primes. These participants showed significantly slower 
response times to the target sentences when the target sentences followed a different 
meaning prime, in comparison to when the target sentence followed a neutral prime. The 
low-skilled comprehenders did not exhibit this effect. Response times to target sentences 
were not different following the neutral and different meaning primes. These findings 
show that both high- and low- skilled comprehenders show enhancement when the target 
followed same meaning primes, but only the high-skilled comprehenders show suppression 
o f the different meaning primes.
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This study demonstrated that high-skilled comprehenders efficiently enhanced the 
relevant meanings o f homophones when reading sentences and suppressed the 
irrelevant meanings of the homophones. Therefore, these readers make use o f sentence 
context more efficiently than do low-skilled readers. Low-skilled readers, on the other 
hand, process words in sentences in a similar fashion to the children who were identified as 
poor comprehenders in the Merrill et al. (1981) study. That is, the poor comprehenders 
keep active all meanings of the individual word meanings, rather than only the meaning 
that is implied by the sentence.
This phenomenon has significance for the present set o f experiments. As was 
discussed in the previous section on problem solving, much research in problem solving 
has investigated the degree to which individuals are able to make use of surface and 
structural features o f information that is known to be available to them when they are 
faced with a problem solving situation. As was outlined in the chapter on problem 
solving, a number o f researchers have shown that poor problem solvers tend to focus on 
surface features o f available information, while more skilled problem solvers focus on the 
structural features of the problem at hand (e.g., Novick, 1988; Stein et al., 1986). I will 
argue that Gemsbacher’s suppression task, which is conceptually very similar to  that used 
by Merrill et al. (1981), will be a useful diagnostic tool for identifying not only poor 
readers/suppressors, but also for identifying poor problem solvers. This is based on the 
assumption that focusing on individual word meanings is similar to attending to  surface 
features o f problems. That is, focusing on surface features o f problems can be compared 
to attending to individual word meanings, while focusing on structural features o f
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problems can be compared to attending to the underlying meaning o f sentences.
Also o f interest in the current paper is individuals' ability to discard information 
that is known to be incorrect when attempting to solve problems. A common method o f 
investigating this ability has been to provide a period o f time between successive attempts 
to solve problems. It is expected that such a duration will serve to diminish the activation 
o f incorrect responses so that participants can access correct solutions, if those solutions 
are within the individual's domain o f knowledge. This is called an incubation procedure. 
The literature involving incubation is the topic o f the next chapter.
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INCUBATION
This chapter first provides a summary o f the concept o f incubation as a general 
phenomenon. As is discussed, the very existence o f this construct has been the subject o f 
contentious debate. Regardless, a number o f researchers have investigated the usefulness 
o f incubation intervals, with varying degrees o f success.
History and Theories o f Incubation
Incubation can be defined as an improvement in solution rate after a period during 
which an unsolved problem has been put aside. Incubation has been the subject o f 
numerous anecdotal reports o f discovery. For example, Archimedes is said to have 
suddenly come upon his realization that the volume o f irregular objects could be 
determined by water displacement as he settled into his bath (Gleitman, 1995). Wallas 
(1926) proposed that an incubation period was essential for all problem solving. During 
this period, earlier-considered ideas are worked on unconsciously, leading to an 
illumination, in which the solution to the problem is suddenly realized.
This "unconscious processing” theory o f incubation has been criticized by 
researchers who point out that the evidence for this phenomenon is based largely on 
self-reports (Weisberg, 1993). Weisberg cites numerous unsuccessful attempts to 
demonstrate the existence o f incubation in various fields, including art, literature, and
30
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science (e.g., Olton & Johnson, 1976; Patrick, 1935, 1937). Weisberg concludes that 
problems are solved in an incremental fashion, based on trial and error.
In contrast to the unconscious processing theory of incubation, Smith and 
Blankenship (1989) have forwarded a blocking theory o f incubation. According to this 
theory, the inability to access relevant information is the result o f this information being 
obstructed by other, related information that is incorrectly accessed. Incubation effects 
are the result o f this incorrect information no longer being available to the solvers on a 
subsequent attempt to solve the problem. That is, activation o f the target response is 
made possible when the competing information is no longer blocking the individual's 
access to this target.
An alternative explanation for incubation was suggested by Yaniv and Meyer 
(1987). This is the Memory-Sensitization Hypothesis, which states that even when a 
problem is unsuccessfully solved, some partial activation o f the target solution takes place. 
This activation sensitizes the individual to later accidental run-ins with related information 
that might serve to raise the target information to the level at which it will be activated by 
the individual. Further, as time passes, the likelihood that this chance encounter will take 
place also increases. Support for each o f these theories is presented in the next section.
Empirical Research 
Empirical investigations o f incubation effects have been few (e.g., Jones & 
Langford, 1987; Murray & Denney, 1969; Olton, 1979; Patrick, 1986; Smith & 
Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987). Further, the finding of incubation
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effects in these studies has varied. For example, Patrick (1986) found incubation effects, 
but only in high-skilled problems solvers. Murray and Denney’s (1969) findings o f 
incubation effects were limited to low-skilled problem solvers. Smith and Blankenship 
(1991), in five experiments, found varied effects o f ability level on incubation.
In a test of their blocking hypothesis, Smith and Blankenship (1989) employed a 
clever methodology. This procedure involved inducing a fixated state in participants. 
Using this procedure, participants were fixated on inappropriate responses to a series of 
picture-word puzzles that Smith and Blankenship referred to as rebuses. An example of 
such a rebus is "timing tim ing.” The solution to this is "split second timing." The rebuses 
were presented on two trials. On the first trial, a misleading clue was presented along with 
the rebus. The purpose o f this clue was to fixate the participants on the misleading 
response, and thereby block the appropriate response. For example, one rebus was "you 
just me,” which represents "just between you and me." The misleading clue in this 
example was "beside."
On the initial experimental phase, participants attempted to solve these rebuses. 
This phase was followed by one o f two second phases. In the control condition, 
participants were immediately presented with the same rebuses to solve. In the incubation 
conditions, participants performed a demanding math test for several minutes and then 
attempted to solve the rebuses a second time. Results showed that the incubation group 
exhibited superior performance on the second trial, while the control group did not. That 
is, an incubation effect was found. Further, when tested for their memory for the 
misleading clues, the incubation participants showed poor memory for the distractors,
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while the controls did not. Taken together, these findings led to Smith and Blankenship's 
(1989) conclusion that incubation effects are the result o f a reduced activation level o f 
inappropriate information. In other words, participants who no longer recalled the 
distractors showed incubation effects.
These findings raise the possibility that individuals who are shown to possess 
inefficient suppression mechanisms, as measured by the Gernsbacher et al. (1990) task, 
will solve fewer problems, and will also demonstrate decreased benefit from an incubation 
period, compared to individuals who exhibit efficient suppression mechanisms. This result 
is anticipated because it is expected that the poor suppressors will have the misleading clue 
information available to them for an extended period o f time, making the access o f the 
appropriate answers less likely. This is conceptually similar to the expectation for the 
previously-described riddle experiments. That is, the poor problem solvers will be those 
who exhibit poor suppression skills and these individuals will benefit less from an 
incubation interval than will more highly skilled problem solvers.
One theoretical issue that might appear to be problematic is the fact that 
Gernsbacher et al.'s (1990) measure o f suppression show the perseveration effect for only 
a brief period o f time. In this study the effect has been shown to continue for a duration of 
one second in the poor suppressors. The present set o f experiments will investigate the 
possibility that suppression failure is the cause o f more long-term deficiencies. This 
assumption is not without precedent in the literature (e.g., Hartman & Hasher, 1991; 
Merrill & Sperber, 1981; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987).
Hartman and Hasher (1991) conducted a test o f the Inhibition Hypothesis in older
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and younger adults. Their procedure involved presenting young and old adults with 
sentences that were missing the final word. These sentences were high-cloze sentences, 
(i.e., the final word was highly suggested by the sentence). For example, one sentence
read "She ladled the soup into h er ." The task was to predict the ending o f each
sentence. Subsequently, the participants were presented with the actual last word in the 
sentence. They were told to remember only this word, and not the word that they had 
predicted, but that had been disconfirmed. In the above example, the supplied word was 
"lap," and the disconfirmed word was "bowl."
Hartman and Hasher (1991) then administered an indirect memory test to 
investigate the activation level o f both the disconfirmed words (e.g., "bowl") and the 
target words (e.g., "lap"). Participants were presented with sentences for which the final 
word was missing. They read the sentences out loud and completed each sentence with 
the first word that came to  mind. These sentences were constructed in pairs, such that one 
sentence in each pair had the earlier-disconfirmed ending as the most likely ending. The 
other was most likely to be completed by the word that had actually been presented in the 
first part o f the experiment. For example, one pair was: "Scotty licked the bottom o f the 
BOWL," and "The kitten slept peacefully on her owner's LAP," with the likely endings 
presented in caps here. In this way, activation o f the presented and disconfirmed endings 
was determined by the time taken to produce the sentence final words.
Results showed that the older adults showed activation of both words, while the 
younger adults showed activation o f only the target words. Hartman and Hasher (1991) 
concluded that older adults' inhibitory mechanisms were impaired, and therefore, they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
were less able to inhibit the extraneous information. O f particular importance to the 
present set o f experiments, the increased activation o f the inappropriate response had a 
rather lengthy duration. Hartman and Hasher measured this activation with a five-minute 
delay between the completion o f the initial task and the onset o f the indirect memory test.
In a similar fashion, Yaniv and Meyer (1987) found activation o f primed 
information after a thirty-minute period. These researchers used a tip-of-the-tongue 
(TOT) paradigm similar to that pioneered by Brown and McNeill's (1966) classic work. 
Similar to the Brown and McNeill studies, Yaniv and Meyer presented participants with 
definitions o f rare words, such as "sextant” and "Damascus.” In instances that participants 
did not produce the target word, they reported how confidently they thought that they did 
know what the word was. That is, they reported whether they were experiencing a TOT 
state. This was followed by a lexical decision task, which included the rare words as well 
as control words for each of the rare words. Finally, participants were given an old-new 
recognition task on which they had to decide whether the words on this task had 
previously appeared on the lexical decision task.
Two results are o f particular relevance. First, response times on the lexical 
decision task and the old-new recognition task were faster for the target words than for 
the control words both when the participants correctly produced the rare word, and when 
the participants reported a TOT for the rare word. This suggests that activation o f the 
target words continued for at least a thirty-minute period. Second, in the TOT condition, 
participants reported a feeling-of-knowing rating (Metcalfe, 1986) for the required word. 
These subjective ratings were inversely related to reaction times in the lexical decision and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
new-old recall tasks. That is, words that elicited stronger feeling-of-knowing ratings 
resulted in faster reaction times for the two indirect memory tests. Yaniv and Meyer 
(1987) concluded that the target words are available even after this long duration o f thirty 
minutes, regardless o f whether the word had actually been accessed in the TOT portion o f 
the test. These indirect memory tests seem especially powerful with respect to the 
feeling-of-knowing rating, given that previous researchers have voiced concerns over 
whether participants might try harder on direct memory tests when they know that they 
have given a high feeling of knowing judgment for a particular item (e.g., Gruneberg, 
Monk, and Sykes, 1977).
While Yaniv and Meyer's (1987) data provide a basis for assuming that activation 
can persist for a long period o f time, it should be noted that these researchers attribute 
their results to quite a different mechanism o f incubation than the one posited by Smith 
and Blankenship (1989). That is, while Smith and Blankenship conclude that incubation 
effects are due to the blocking o f appropriate information at a given time and the 
subsequent lowering o f the activation level o f this extraneous blocking information, Yaniv 
and Meyer's Memory-Sensitization Hypothesis assumes an incubation mechanism that is 
similar to what has been the prevailing wisdom concerning incubation. According to the 
hypothesis, even when a problem is not solved, the solution is activated to some degree.
As time passes, the individual is likely to encounter similar information that serves to 
activate the target information.
These two hypotheses do not seem to be completely at odds with one another. It 
might be that, as the activation level o f competing responses is decreased with passing
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time, the likelihood o f encountering some triggering stimulus is increased. Yaniv and 
Meyer (1987) took no measure o f the words that the participants may have considered, 
but not produced, in the no recall condition. Therefore, the degree to which distractors 
might have been active at both the TOT phase and the indirect memory testing phases is 
unknown.
To summarize, the Smith and Blankenship (1989) blocking paradigm provides a 
method o f inducing fixation subsequently examining the benefit o f various incubation 
intervals in overcoming this fixation. This method will be utilized in the present set o f 
experiments, both by using the Smith and Blankenship methodology and by relating the 
paradigm to other problem solving materials, such as the previously-mentioned riddles. 
Further, the Yaniv and Meyer (1987) data, and the Hartman and Hasher (1991) data, 
provide a basis for the assumption that suppression effects can be expected at longer time 
durations than have been previously demonstrated (e.g., Gernsbacher et al., 1990). It is 
predicted that these long-term effects will be present to  a greater degree in those 
individuals who demonstrate inefficient suppression ability in the Gernsbacher et al. 
paradigm. Specifically, inefficient suppressors will not benefit from the decrease in 
activation level o f incorrect responses that is normally afforded by period o f incubation. 
Conversely, it was expected that the efficient suppressors will make use o f the incubation 
period to discard the incorrect solutions. The following section furnishes a justification 
for relating the usefulness o f an incubation period to  problem solving and suppression 
abilities.
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Incubation and Problem Solving Ability
Past researchers have demonstrated incubation effects using a variety o f problem 
solving tasks (e.g., Dominowski & Jenrick, 1972; Jones & Langford, 1987; Murray & 
Denney, 1969; Olton, 1979; Patrick, 1986; Smith & Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Yaniv & 
Meyer, 1987). However, the finding o f differential effects o f incubation on competent 
versus poor problem solvers has been inconsistent. Murray and Denny found incubation 
effects, but only in low-skilled problem solvers. Patrick's incubation effects were limited 
to the high-ability solvers. Smith and Blankenship (1991) found mixed results, with some 
o f their five experiments showing greater incubation benefits for good problem solvers, 
and other problems resulting in greater benefit for the poor solvers.
Smith and Blankenship (1991) related their findings o f incubation to the difficulty 
o f the tasks administered in each o f their experiments. They concluded that "incubation 
might be most likely to occur when easy-to-solve problems are initially thwarted by 
fixation," (p. 83). They further speculate that the problem solving ability o f the individual 
might be one determiner of whether incubation would be beneficial to solution. In other 
words, incubation intervals are most beneficial to low-skilled problem solvers when the 
task o f interest is relatively easy. This is a reasonable conclusion, given that problem 
solving could not be enhanced if the problems were simply too difficult for the individuals 
to solve.
In an early study of incubation effects, Murray and Denny (1969) presented their 
participants with Saugstad's "ball problem" (Saugstad and Raaheim, 1957). This problem 
required participants to devise a method o f transferring a number of steel balls from one
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area o f a room to another, using the objects available to them. These objects include 
several types o f tools, including some string, a pulley, etc. Prior to attempting this task, 
participants were categorized as high- or low-ability problem solvers according to their 
scores on the Gestalt Transformation Test, which is a essentially a measure o f 
susceptibility to functional fixedness. Each o f twenty problems requires the participant to 
choose the one of five given items that could best be used for a particular function. For 
example, from the choices; tree, cigarette, shirt, bicycle, eyeglasses, from which could one 
make a hose?
Results showed that the low-ability problem solvers benefited from an interrupted 
period o f problem solving, in which they performed a demanding filler task. Conversely, 
high-ability solvers performed better under a continuous session o f working on the 
problem. Murray and Denny (1969) concluded that the low-ability solvers may have 
benefited from the interrupted session because they were more prone to blocking effects 
from the usual uses for the objects that were to be used to solve the problem. In 
accordance with Smith and Blankenship's conjecture, Murray and Denny speculated that 
the interruption by the filler task might have served to weaken the effect o f the fixated 
responses in these low-ability solvers. With regard to the high-ability solvers, the 
interruption o f work disrupted their ability to solve the problem. Murray and Denny 
concluded that this effect was the result o f the high-ability solvers not fixating on the 
stereotypical uses o f the objects, and therefore that interruption only served to disrupt the 
"fluidity" of their solving process.
Smith and Blankenship (1991) followed-up their earlier work, using the Remote
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Associates Test (RAT) as a measure o f problem solving ability. Participants were 
presented with a series o f three-word RAT items, for which they were required to produce 
the common words. These RAT items were presented two times to all participants. For 
fixation conditions, on the first trial the items were accompanied by distractor words that 
were meant to fixate the participants. For example, the RAT item; LICK, SPRINKLE, 
MINES was accompanied by the words, "tongue," "rain," "gold." The solution to this 
example is "salt." Participants were told that the accompanying words were similar to the 
correct solution, and that they should use these words to help them solve each RAT item. 
Participants in the no-fixation conditions solved the RAT items without the presence o f 
the distractors. On the second trial, all participants were presented with the same RAT 
items to  be solved a second time. On this trial, no distractors were presented to any 
groups. The control group had no time interval between the two tests, while the 
incubation group was given a filler test to perform before the onset o f the retest. This 
entailed reading a compelling short story for which the participants expected to answer 
comprehension questions.
Two effects o f interest were found. The first was that the participants who were 
fixated on incorrect responses exhibited an incubation effect. That is, their solving 
performance was significantly greater on the second trial than on the first. This supports 
Smith and Blankenship's (1989) blocking theory, in that incubation results from the 
removal o f the fixating information. Second, participants who had low scores on the 
initial RAT exhibited the greatest incubation effects. However, in four subsequent 
experiments, the effects o f ability level on incubation were mixed. In one experiment
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(Experiment 2), the incubation effect was limited to the medium-ability participants. In 
another (Experiment 5), the effect was demonstrated only in the high-ability participants. 
As mentioned earlier, Smith and Blankenship concluded that incubation effects are 
evidenced when easy-to-solve problems are presented, along with some distracting 
information.
While Smith and Blankenship's (1991) findings varied with respect to the 
relationship between problem solving and incubation, previous research has shown that 
high-ability problem solvers benefit more from an incubation period than low-ability 
problem solvers do (Patrick, 1986). Patrick also used the RAT as a problem solving 
measure. He concluded that high-ability problem solvers benefit more from an incubation 
period than low-ability solvers because the high-ability solvers use the interruption as a 
means of breaking away from incorrect solutions and getting a "fresh start" when the 
problem is re-presented. Low-ability solvers, on the other hand, return to the same 
incorrect responses that they produced on the first presentation o f the problem. The 
present hypothesis concurs with Patrick's analysis. It is expected that high-ability problem 
solvers will make better use o f the incubation period because these individuals will be 
better able to consider new solutions after a time away from working on them.
Past researchers have provided explanations for the failure o f participants to solve 
problems in a non-incubation condition, using a variety o f problem solving tasks (e.g., 
Goldman, Wolters, & Winograd, 1992; Peterson, 1974; Rundus, 1973; Smith & Vela, 
1991). In a free recall task o f a list o f words, Madigan (1976) had participants recall the 
studied list items several times. He found that items that were not recalled on early recall
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attempts were successfully recalled on later tests, a phenomenon referred to as 
reminiscence. This effect has been demonstrated numerous times in the literature (e.g., 
Roediger & Thorpe, 1978). Madigan posited that participants experienced output 
interference in the list recall task, such that retrieval o f some o f the Hons blocked access 
to additional items. According to Madigan, reminiscence results when participants are 
retested and the activation o f the previously-recalled items has decreased.
Rundus (1973) coined the term, "stopping rule," to describe the reminiscence 
effect. This rule states that participants will stop their attempts to retrieve additional list 
items after they have failed to retrieve any new items for some period o f time. In other 
words, they will abandon the retrieval process when they surmise that further retrieval 
attempts will not be successful. Smith and Vela (1991) suggested that the stopping rule 
might be applied to fixation and incubation effects observed in the problem solving 
literature. They posit that an incubation period serves to reduce the activation level o f 
competing responses, or fixators, thus allowing access to other possible solutions at 
retesting.
Attenuation o f Fixation Effects in Incubation Paradigms 
As was shown in the previous section, the effects o f the distractors in the RAT 
experiments were short-lived. Solution rates increased significantly after the incubation 
periods. When provided with a second chance to solve the RAT items, in the absence o f 
distracting words, participants were able to do so. This effect is in contrast to the results 
o f the riddle experiments. In those experiments, participants did not exhibit a release from
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the fixating effects o f their initial solutions to the riddles. The current experiments 
investigated fundamental differences in these two types o f problems that might contribute 
to these differential attenuation effects.
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EXPERIMENTS
The preceding discussion provides a context for the present set o f experiments. 
The overview o f the suppression and verbal comprehension literature provides a 
foundation for the claim that ineffective suppression mechanisms contribute to  problem 
solving deficits. To this end, Experiments 1 and 3 included an administration o f the 
suppression measure developed by Gemsbacher et al. (1991). It was expected that 
performance on this task will be related to performance on a series o f problem solving 
tasks. Experiment I investigated the relationship between suppression efficiency and 
ability to solve insight riddles similar to  those used by Perfetto et al. (1983). Experiment 3 
examined the possibility o f a  similar relationship between suppression efficiency and 
performance on the RAT test. The riddles task and the RAT task are conceptually similar 
if one considers that both rely on the ability to make remote associations. For the RAT 
task, this is based on ability to realize ways that words are related to  each other via their 
independent associations to  other words, hi the riddles task, solvers must recognize the 
relationship between the clue sentences and the riddles.
Experiments 2 and 3 examined the degree to which the fixating effects o f incorrect 
responses could be attenuated by the introduction o f an incubation period. Experiment 2 
made use o f the riddles in this endeavor, while Experiment 3 used the RAT items.
44
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Additionally, Experiments 3 and 4 investigated the effects o f problem solving ability on the 
usefulness o f an incubation period.
Finally, Experiment 4  examined the degree to which fixation effects can be 
manipulated by instructions. Participants were instructed either to attend to the distractors 
or were encouraged to ignore them. This provided a method o f delineating between 
strategies employed when solving the RAT hems and the effects o f the distractors, per se.
Because the experimental tasks used in the present dissertation are varied, Table 1 
is included to aid the reader in keeping track of the task(s) administered in each 
experiment.
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Table I. Objectives and Tasks Administered: Experiments 1 - 4.
Experiment Measures Objectives
1 a) Insight Riddles
b) Suppression Task
Predict problem solving performance 
from suppression skill.
2 a) Insight Riddles Determine if fixation to riddle 
solutions can be attenuated 
by means o f an incubation period.
3 a) RAT
b) Suppression Task
Predict problem solving performance 
from suppression skill.
Relate problem solving performance 
to incubation effects.
4 a) RAT Investigate the attentional component 
involved in ignoring extraneous 
stimuli.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
Expsrimgptl
In this experiment, participants were presented with two tasks. These were the 
ambiguous words task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990), and a version o f the riddle 
task used by Perfetto et al. (1983). The primary objective o f this experiment was to 
determine if performance on the problem solving task was predictive of performance on 
the suppression task. In support o f Gemsbacher et al.'s general suppression mechanism, it 
was expected that all readers would experience difficulty in rejecting ambiguous target 
words at the 100 ms delay. It was further expected that readers who demonstrated poor 
problem solving skills would continue to experience difficulty on the ambiguous words 
task, even at the 850 ms delay. Participants who show high performance on the problem 
solving task are not expected to show this difficulty at the 850 ms delay.
Problem solving ability was assessed in two ways. The first was by measuring 
participants1 ability to  spontaneously transfer the information provided in the clue 
sentences when presorted with the riddles. The second was a measurement o f their ability 
to make use o f the clue information after being informed to do so. These measures were 
used because it has been demonstrated that individuals are not likely to spontaneously 
access such information (e.g., Perfetto et al., 1983). Therefore, using only the 
spontaneous transfer measure to define problem solving ability would likely not yield 
results o f interest.
Experiment 1 followed up on Gemsbacher et al.'s (1990) findings. It was expected 
that high-ability problem solvers, at least those who were able to access the clue 
information in the informed condition, should experience diminished difficulty in rejecting
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the ambiguous target words at the long-delay interval. Such a finding would lend support 
to Gemsbacher's claim that suppression is a general cognitive mechanism.
The riddle procedure was very similar to that used by Perfetto et al. (1983).
Several modifications were made to the riddle task for the present experiment. There 
were four groups o f participants. All groups were presented with two trials o f the riddles. 
The first trial contained half o f the riddles and the second trial contained all o f the riddles. 
The baseline group solved the riddles without first being presented with the clue 
sentences. All other groups were presented with the acquisition sentences prior to  the first 
presentation o f the riddles. The informed group was informed o f the relationship between 
the acquisition sentences and the riddles before the first trial o f riddle solving. There were 
two groups who were not informed of this relationship. The first o f these groups was 
identical to the uninformed group in the previous experiments. This group was informed 
o f the relationship between the riddles and the acquisition sentences after the first solution 
trial. This group will be referred to as U-L, to show that they were uninformed on Trial 1 
and informed on Trial 2. The second uninformed group was never informed o f this 
relationship between the acquisition sentences and the riddles. This group will be referred 
to as the U-U group, to show that they were informed neither on Trial 1, nor on Trial 2.
To reiterate, the major changes in the riddle procedure in comparison to previous 
experiments were the addition o f the second uninformed (U-U) condition, and presenting 
the baseline group with the riddles on two trials. These changes were made to test a 
phenomenon not addressed in the previous experiments using these materials, but that has 
been demonstrated in other studies that have investigated practice effects in problem
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solving (e.g., Goldman et al., 1992; Lung & Dominoski, 1985). Goldman et al. 
investigated the effects o f incubation periods on the solution rates o f anagrams. They 
found that longer incubation periods did increase these solution rates. O f particular 
importance to the present set o f experiments, their results also suggested a general effect 
o f improvement on these types o f problems. That is, the data showed a trend for 
increased performance in overall ability to solve anagrams, although the analysis was not 
significant. This was shown by individuals' performance on new anagrams (those that had 
not previously been presented) increasing during the incubation trials. In other words, 
participants solved more anagrams on Trial 2 than they did on Trial 1, and this effect was 
observed in both the old (previously presented) and the new anagrams. This suggests that 
they might have become more skilled in their anagram solution ability. Although this 
generalized improvement effect was not found to be significant in the Goldman et al. 
study, the authors suggested that such a phenomenon might be considered in future 
studies o f incubation.
The present experiment provided an investigation o f Goldman et al.'s (1992) 
observation in two ways. The first was by examining the degree to which participants in 
the baseline group show improvement from Trial 1 to Trial 2. Given that the baseline 
group had no clue sentences to rely on, any increase in solution rate from Trial 1 to Trial 2 
might be seen as a general increase in their ability to solve these types o f riddles. The 
second method was similar to the first. By including the U-U group, a determination 
could be made regarding the degree to which uninformed group might show improvement 
in solution rate from Trial 1 to Trial 2, in the absence o f explicit instructions to use the




Participants. Eighty University o f New Hampshire undergraduates participated in 
order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Twenty participants were randomly 
assigned to each o f four experimental groups. These four groups were based on the riddle 
condition that participants were presented with; baseline, U-I, U-U, and informed. All 
participants also completed the ambiguous words task.
Materials. The puzzle materials were taken from Gardner (1978). These were 
similar to those used by Perfetto et al. (1983) and were composed o f eleven insight riddles 
and corresponding clue sentences, along with three filler riddles that did not have relevant 
clue sentences. An example o f the riddles is as follows: "A minister marries several people 
each week." This sentence served as a clue for the riddle, "A man who lived in a small 
town in the U. S. married 20 different women o f the same town. All are still living and he 
has never divorced any o f them. Yet, he has broken no law. Can you explain?" For Trial 
1 presentation, the riddles were divided into two sets o f equal difficulty, A and B, based 
on pilot studies. Each o f these sets consisted o f five o f the riddles, along with three filler 
riddles. Additionally, the final riddle in each set was this item, "A man was caught in the 
rain with no hat or umbrella. There was nothing over his head and his clothes got soaked, 
but not a hair on his head got wet. How is this possible?" The clue sentence for this 
riddle was, "After taking a shower a bald man does not have to dry his hair." This riddle 
was not included in the analysis, but was included to  demonstrate to informed groups the 
relationship between the riddles and the clue sentences. Therefore, each set contained a
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total o f 9 riddles. Each set was further divided into two subsets by randomizing the order 
o f presentation o f the riddles in the set. These materials are included in Appendix A.
The suppression task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990) was also administered. 
These materials include short sentences that end in either an ambiguous word or in a non- 
ambiguous word. For example, one sentence was, "He dug with the spade," or "He dug 
with a shovel.” A test word followed each sentence. This word was related to the 
"other” meaning o f the ambiguous word. In the given example, the test word is "ACE," 
which is related to the non-presented meaning o f "spade,” but not to  the meaning used in 
the sentence context. Eighty filler sentences also were used. These sentences were similar 
to the experimental sentences, except that the test word was related to the meaning o f the 
sentence. For example, the sentence, "She liked the flower," was followed by the test 
word, "ROSE." The experimental sentences all required a "no" response, while the filler 
sentences required a "yes" response. Four stimulus sets were constructed. Across these 
sets, each of the experimental sentences occurred once in each o f the four experimental 
conditions; 100 ms ambiguous, 100 ms unambiguous, 850 ms ambiguous, and 850 ms 
unambiguous.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one o f the four experimental 
groups, based on the riddle condition that they received. They were tested individually in 
an experimental session that lasted approximately 45 minutes. Participants were first 
presented with the suppression task. In this task, sentences were presented one word at a 
time on an IBM 486 computer. Each sentence was followed by a test word that appeared 
either 100 ms later (immediate interval) or 850 ms later (delayed interval). The test word
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was capitalized and surrounded by asterisks, for example: **ACE**. Each word in the 
sentences was presented for a duration equal to a constant o f300 ms plus 16.7 ms per 
character. The interval between each word was 150 ms. Participants were instructed to 
response "yes" if the test word matched the meaning o f the sentence that they just read 
and to respond "no" if  the test word did not do so. They responded "yes" by pressing the 
"z" key with the left index finger, or "no" by pressing the "/" key with the right index 
finger. Participants were provided with feedback after each trial. This task required 
approximately 15 minutes for completion. The dependent variable was recorded as the 
time required to respond "yes" or "no."
After completing the suppression task, all participants except those in the baseline 
group were presented with the eleven clue sentences on a Macintosh SE computer. An 
additional two sentences were presented as fillers, one at the beginning and the other at 
the a id  o f the list o f sentences, for a total o f thirteen acquisition sentences. Participants1 
task was to rate the truthfulness o f each sentence. Participants were instructed to read 
each sentence carefully and rate how truthful the sentence was, on a scale from 1 (never 
true) to 5 (always true). Subsequent to the rating task there was a three-minute filler 
period in which participants were asked for their student ID cards and their names were 
recorded on attendance sheets. This filler period was designed to create a separation 
between the rating task and the presentation o f the riddles.
Each group was presented with the riddles on two separate trials. On the first 
trial, five o f the experimental riddles were presented. The first three were filler riddles, 
also taken from Gardner (1978). These were included to  further separate the rating task
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from the riddles. In total, there was approximately a six-minute delay between completion 
o f the rating task and the presentation o f the experimental riddles. All participants were 
told that they were would read a series o f puzzles that had difficult solutions and that their 
task was to try to provide a solution for each riddle. The riddles were then presented one 
at a time. Participants had one minute to type in their response to each riddle.
Participants in the informed group were told that the previous sentences would help in 
solving most o f the problems. Neither uninformed group was told o f this relationship.
On the second presentation trial, participants were told that they would again be 
presented with the same riddles to solve, along with some additional riddles. Participants 
in the informed group and in the U-I group were told that the sentences that they rated 
previously could serve as clues to helping them solve most o f the problems. To make this 
point clear, the experimenter read the "bald" riddle aloud and the corresponding 
acquisition sentence from the rating task. The bald riddle was not included in the data 
analysis and was not included on Trial 2. U-U participants were not informed o f the 
usefulness of the acquisition sentence prior to Trial 2 solving. These participants were 
simply told that they would receive another trial of the same riddles, along with some 
additional riddles.
All participants were asked if  they had previously seen any o f the riddles and if 
they had any prior knowledge o f the experimental procedure. This resulted in elimination 
o f one participant from the baseline group, one from the informed group, and two 
participants from each of the uninformed groups. These participants were replaced with 
additional participants.
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Results
Solutions to the riddles and response times in the suppression task were recorded. 
For the suppression data, responses that were incorrect, were more than three deviations 
from the mean, or were greater than 2,000 milliseconds were discarded. This resulted in 
elimination o f less than 9%  o f the data. For all results reported in this dissertation, 
analyses were considered significant at a 0.05 alpha level. All planned comparisons used a 
Bonferroni procedure with a familywise error rate o f 0.05.
Riddle Performance. Preliminary analysis o f the riddle data looked for differences 
between the two sets A and B o f Trial 1 riddles. This analysis revealed no differences in 
solution rates for the two sets o f riddles. Therefore, all data were analyzed together.
Mean percentages for both trials are presented in Table 2.
Trial 1 data and Trial 2 data were analyzed separately. Trial 1 data for groups U-I 
and U-U provided a measure o f spontaneous transfer, given that participants had not yet 
been informed o f the relationship between the clue sentences and the riddles. A one-way, 
between subjects ANOVA was performed on Trial 1 data. This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect o f group, E (3, 76) = 15.3, MSe = 1.27. Planned comparisons 
confirmed that the informed group solved more riddles than all other groups. Between the 
informed and the baseline groups, 1 (18) = 6.58, informed and the U-I group, i  (18) =
3.08, and informed and the U-U group, t  (18) = 4.48. Also, the baseline group solved 
fewer riddles than the U-I group, i  (18) = 3.50, but the comparison between the baseline 
and U-U groups did not reach significance, t  (18) = 2.10, p  = .23. Thus, the only 
unexpected finding was that U-I participants solved significantly more riddles on Trial 1
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Table 2. Mean Solution Percentages for Riddle Trials 1 and 2: Experiment 1
Trial 1 Trial 2
Old New
Condition M SD M SD M SD
Baseline 6.0 9.4 5.0 8.7 16.0 19.6
U-I 31.0 27.4 40.0 24.4 51.0 21.4
U-U 21.0 19.9 27.0 20.2 44.0 18.6
Informed 53.0 29.2 62.0 25.2 51.0 25.6
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than did the baseline group. This provides evidence for spontaneous transfer in this group.
Trial 2 data were analyzed using a 2 (old/new) by 4 (group) mixed ANOVA. This 
revealed a significant main effect o f the old/new variable, E ( l, 76) = 5.99, MSe = .76. 
There was also a main effect o f group, E (3, 76) = 22.2, MSe = 1.56. O f particular 
interest, there was a significant interaction between these two variables, E (3, 76) = 4.49, 
MSe = 3.41.
An analysis of simple main effects showed that both groups o f uninformed 
participants solved significantly more new problems than old problems on Trial 2. For 
U-U, 1(19) = 4.68, and for U-I, t  (19) = 2.15. For the baseline group, the difference was 
very close to significant, in the direction o f more solutions to new than old problems, I 
(19) = 2.02, p  = .06. Finally, the informed group solved more old problems than new, but 
this difference did not approach significance, 1(19) = 1.27, p  = .22. Thus, the data for this 
old/new variable replicate the results o f Perfetto et al., for the uninformed groups.
Suppression And Problem Solving Abilitv. Also o f interest was the relationship 
between the suppression task data and participants' problem solving ability. This ability 
was measured in two ways. The first was participants' ability to make use o f the clues 
sentences without being instructed to do so (spontaneous transfer). The second was the 
ability to make use of the clue sentences after having been instructed to do so (informed 
transfer). These analyses are described separately.
Suppression and Spontaneous Transfer Ability. Data from the two uninformed 
conditions (U-I and U-U) performance on Trial 1 o f the riddle task were used to 
categorize participants into two groups; those who showed evidence for spontaneous
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transfer and those who did not. Successful transferrers were defined as participants who 
scored above the median on Trial 1. The no-transfer group solved below the median on 
Trial I . This division resulted in 14 participants in the transfer group and 26 participants 
in the no-transfer group.
Mean reaction times for the two groups o f participants at each delay interval of 
the ambiguous words task are shown in Table 3. Separate 2 (transfer ability) x 2 (degree 
of ambiguity) ANOVAs were used to analyze the amount o f interference that participants 
experienced at each delay interval. That is, the difference between participants' mean 
reaction time to reject ambiguous words at the 100 ms interval was compared to their 
mean reaction time to reject unambiguous words at 100 ms. Likewise, this comparison 
was made for the 850 ms interval.
At the 100 ms interval, both groups o f participants suffered significant interference 
from the ambiguous sentence-final word (SFW). A main effect o f ability level was found, 
with the high ability transfer group displaying faster overall reaction times, E (1, 38) = 
17.4, MSe = 43,483. There was also a significant main effect of degree o f ambiguity, E 
(1, 38) = 37.3, MSe = 2,068. The interaction between these factors approached, but did 
not reach significance, E (1, 38) = 3.90, MSe = 2,068, p  >.05. Simple effects tests 
revealed a significant difference for the no-transfer group between the ambiguous and 
unambiguous conditions at this delay, 1 (25) = 5.50. The transfer group showed the same 
effect, t  (13) = 2.87. Thus, both the transfer and no-transfer groups displayed an increase 
in response time to the target word when the SFW was ambiguous with respect to the 
target word.
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Table 3. Mean Reaction Times for Spontaneous Transfer and No-Transfer Groups at 100 
and 850 ms Delays: Experiment I
Delay Interval
100 ms 850 ms
Ability Ambig Unambig Diff Ambig Unambig Diff
High 738 693 45 640 625 15
Low 960 874 86 890 830 40
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The data for the 850 ms level also revealed a main effect of ability level, £  (1 ,38)
= 16.2, MSe = 58,124. A significant main effect o f degree o f ambiguity was found, E (1, 
38) = 14.3, MSe = 1,766. Importantly, an interaction effect was found at this delay 
interval, E (1, 38) = 5.17, MSe = 1,766. Analysis o f ample main effects showed that the 
no-transfer participants exhibited a significant difference in reaction times between the 
ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at this delay, 1 (25) = 4.35. The high-ability 
transfer participants did not exhibit differential response rates, t  (13) = 1.83, g  = .09.
In sum, these results demonstrate that the no-transfer participants are much slower 
to respond overall. These individuals also take longer to reject the ambiguity, especially at 
the 850 ms duration.
Regression analysis. An alternative way o f examining these results was through a 
multiple regression analysis, which was applied to the data from the 850 ms delay 
condition. The number o f riddles solved on Trial 1 was the dependent variable. The were 
two predictor variables. The first was the difference in response time between the 
ambiguous and unambiguous conditions. The second was the average response time for 
the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions. These predictor variables were chosen in an 
effort to examine the relative effects o f the ambiguity manipulation and o f overall speed of 
response.
This analysis revealed that the two variables together accounted for 27.5% o f the 
variance (23.5% adjusted) in riddle solutions. Only the average response time variable 
contributed significantly to the regression, t  (37) = 3.29. The difference variable did not 
make a significant contribution, 1 (37) =1.11.
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Suppression and Informed Problem Solving Ability. A separate set o f analyses 
was conducted for the informed trials o f the riddles. These analyses included Trial 2 
solution rate for the U-I group and the informed group. Thus, these data were used as a 
measure o f informed problem solving ability. Participants were again divided into high 
and low scorers, on the basis o f performance on Trial 2. Participants scoring above the 
mean were classified as high scorers, while low scorers were those who scored below the 
mean on Trial 2. This classification was conducted separately for each o f the three 
groups. This resulted in 19 participants in the low ability group and 21 in the high ability 
group. Mean reaction times for each group at both the 100 ms and 850 ms delay interval 
are shown in Table 4.
Separate 2 (problem solving ability) x 2 (degree o f ambiguity) ANOVAs were 
again used to analyze the amount o f interference that participants experienced at each 
delay interval. The analysis from the 100 ms delay is reported first. This analysis revealed 
a main effect of ability level, with the high-ability problem solving group displaying faster 
overall reaction times, E (1, 38) = 8.61, MSe = 41,287. There was also a significant main 
effect o f degree of ambiguity, with fester response times to the unambiguous versus 
ambiguous words, E (I, 38) = 56.2, MSe = 1,638. The interaction between these factors 
also reached significance, E (1, 38) = 5.25, MSe = 1,638. Planned comparisons showed 
that both groups experienced significant interference in the ambiguous condition. For the 
high-ability solvers, 1 (18) = 5.66, and for the low-ability group, i  (20) = 4.80.
The data for the 850 ms level also revealed a main effect o f ability level, E (1,38)
= 9.44, MSe = 59,818. A significant main effect o f degree o f ambiguity was found, E (I,
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Table 4. Mean Reaction Times for High- and Low-Ability Informed Problem Solvers at 
100 and 850 ms Delays: Experiment 1
Delay Interval
100 ms 850 ms
Transfer Ability Ambig Unambig Diff Ambig Unambig Diff
High 795 748 47 690 676 14
Low 950 861 89 878 823 55
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38) = 14.8, MSe = 1,556. As in the 100 ms delay condition, an interaction effect was 
found at this interval, E (1, 38) = 5.29, MSe = 1,556. Analysis of simple main effects 
showed that the low-ability problem solvers continued to show significant differences 
between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at the 850 ms delay, 1 (18) = 3.19. 
This analysis approached but did not reach significance for the high-ability informed 
solvers, t  (20) = 2.04, p  = .06.
The differences in reaction times in the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions are 
larger for the no-transfer versus the transfer groups. This supports the prediction that the 
suppression task is an appropriate marker o f problem solving ability. However, the 
differences in the overall reaction times for these two groups o f participants are also 
compelling.
Regression analysis To further explore the differential impact o f the difference 
scores between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions, and of overall response 
speed, a multiple regression was conducted for the 850 ms duration. The number o f 
riddles solved on Trial 2 was the dependent variable. Results showed that the two 
variables accounted for 18.9% o f the variance (14.6% adjusted). As was the case in the 
spontaneous transfer analysis, only the average speed variable contributed significantly to 
the regression, 1 (37) = 2.5. The difference variable did not approach significance, t  (37) = 
.12
Discussion
Riddles Results. Results o f Experiment 1 are in accordance with major 
predictions. One surprising finding was that o f significant spontaneous transfer in U-I
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condition. This is contrary to earlier findings by Perfetto et al. (1983) and others (e.g., 
Ross et al., 1989; Weisberg et al., 1978; but see Bowden, 1985). However, there was no 
evidence o f transfer in group U-U. Several other results o f the riddle experiment replicate 
earlier findings o f Perfetto et al.
O f particular interest to the present set o f experiments, the Trial 2 solution rate for 
"old" problems was lower for the initially uninformed group than for the informed 
participants, who were aware o f the relationship between the acquisition sentences and the 
riddles on Trial 1. This finding was predicted from results o f the previous studies. In this 
respect, U-U participants showed a pattern o f Trial 2 solving similar to that o f the U-I 
group. That is, U-U group displayed improvement from Trial 1 to Trial 2, and this 
improvement was largely confined to the "new" riddles. These effects were somewhat 
surprising, given that the U-U group was never informed o f the relationship between the 
acquisition sentences and the riddles. This suggests that U-U group somehow became 
"informed," or aware, of this relationship without being explicitly informed. This finding 
will be discussed further in the general discussion.
Suppression Efficiency and Spontaneous Transfer. Two results relating 
suppression efficiency to problem solving are more pertinent to the primary focus of this 
dissertation. The first compared suppression ability to spontaneous transfer. The second 
compared suppression ability to the ability to solve the riddles when participants were 
informed o f the relationship between the acquisition sentences and the riddles. The former 
ability might be characterized as the ability to recognize that some particular information is 
relevant for solving a problem at hand and using that information accordingly. The latter
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process involves the ability to make use of information when its relevance is already 
known. Numerous studies have shown that simply possessing necessary information is not 
sufficient to facilitate solving, but that individuals must also access that information at the 
appropriate time (e.g., Perfetto et al. 1983; Spencer & Weisberg, 1986; Stein et al., 1986). 
These studies have shown that individuals are very unlikely to spontaneously access the 
relevant information unless they are explicitly instructed to do so. In contrast, the present 
experiment did show evidence for spontaneous transfer in the U-U condition.
The present experiment also showed evidence for a  relationship between the 
facility for spontaneous transfer in the riddle experiment and performance on the 
suppression task, given that the interaction between transfer ability and level o f ambiguity 
was very close to significant. Both groups, those who demonstrated spontaneous transfer 
and those who did not, experienced difficulty in rejecting the ambiguous test words at the 
100 ms delay condition. However, only the no-transfer participants continued to 
experience difficulty in rejecting the ambiguous words at the 8S0 ms delay. This supports 
Gemsbacher et al.'s (1990) results and suggests that the suppression measure is an 
appropriate predictor o f spontaneous transfer ability.
There was also a significant difference between the participants who did show 
transfer and those who did not, with regard to overall reaction time on the suppression 
task. The transfer participants demonstrated significantly fester reaction times at both 
delay durations than the no-transfer participants. This finding replicates Gemsbacher et 
al.'s (1990) results comparing reaction times for their high-and low-ability readers using 
these same materials.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
Suppression Efficiency and Informed Problem Solving Ability. The results 
comparing suppression performance for the high- and low-ability participants in the 
informed solving conditions very closely parallel the results of the spontaneous transfer 
conditions. For both the high- and low-ability informed solvers, there were increased 
response times to the target word when the SFW was ambiguous with regard to the target 
word. The interaction o f ability level and ambiguity reached significance at the 850 ms 
delay, with the high-ability informed solvers displaying reduced differences in reaction 
times at this delay, in comparison to the low-ability informed solvers.
The present experiment shows a similar relationship between the suppression 
measure and informed problem solving. This result might be analyzed through the scope 
o f the general suppression mechanism posited by Gemsbacher and colleagues (e.g., 
Gemsbacher et al., 1990; Gemsbacher & Robertson, 1995). Those experiments showed 
that less-skilled readers are less able than high-skilled readers to suppress inappropriate 
meanings o f ambiguous words (as was replicated here), less-skilled readers are less able to 
suppress inappropriate meanings o f homophones, etc. It is important to note that these 
experiments also showed that less-skilled readers were not inferior to high-skilled readers 
in their ability to maintain activation o f appropriate meanings of ambiguous words 
(Gemsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gemsbacher & Robertson, 1995). This suggests that the 
less-skilled readers are not experiencing difficulty with rejecting the ambiguous word 
because they do not appreciate the meaning o f the sentence. Rather, the deficiency seems 
to lie in the inability to discard irrelevant information in an efficient manner.
This conclusion can be directly applied to the riddles used in the present study.
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For example, consider the minister riddle. In order to successfully solve this riddle, one 
must look beyond the most common meaning of words such as, "marry," and "divorce." 
While any college student would be able to report the multiple meanings o f such words if 
asked to do so, that does not ensure that all o f them would consciously access these 
multiple meanings in the context o f this riddle. From the present results, it seems that 
individuals who exhibit poor suppression ability on the on-line task developed by 
Gernsbacher and colleagues are less able than their high-ability counterparts to reject the 
more familiar meanings o f common words, such as "marry,” in an off-line task.
This process is similar to that proposed by Gick and Holyoak (1983) in their 
description o f good versus poor problem solvers. They showed that successful problem 
solvers focused on structural similarities between base analogs and target problems when 
solving the radiation problem, for example. Poor problem solvers, on the other hand, 
focused on surface similarities between the base and target. In relation to the present set 
o f experiments, it is assumed that realizing the proper word meanings indicated in each 
riddle is central to making use o f the clue sentences (Bowden, 1985; Lockhart et al., 1988; 
Stein et al., 1986). Given that the present experiment showed that poor suppressors 
performed poorly on the riddle task, one might conjecture that they focus only on the 
usual meaning o f those words as specified in the riddle. There was very little surface 
similarity between the riddles and corresponding clue sentences, given that they shared 
few common words, as shown by Bowden (1986) and Stein et al. (1988). Therefore, in 
order to solve, that is; to access the correct information, even when directed to do so, 
participants would have to perceive the structural similarity between the two sources o f
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information.
Experiments 3 and 4 further explored this possibility, using a different set o f 
problem solving materials. In these experiments, the Remote Association Test (RAT) 
(Mednick, 1962) was used as a measure o f the ability to ignore useless information when 
solving problems. This allowed for the investigation o f the role that suppression ability 
might play in the ability to  make remote associations. Specifically, these experiments 
determined whether high-skilled suppressors would also be better able to solve RATs.
In sum, the present experiment showed that poor suppression ability is correlated 
with poor ability to solve the riddles, in both the spontaneous and informed conditions. 
Past research that has focused on the characteristics o f those individuals who do exhibit 
such skills (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Novick, 1988). The present results suggest that 
suppression ability should be added to the list o f factors that contribute to skillful transfer, 
both spontaneous transfer and directed. Experiment 3 will determine if the suppression 
task can predict further predict problem solving ability on the RAT.
Experiment 2 investigated the possibility that the deleterious effects o f incorrect 
solutions to the riddles on Trial 1 can be attenuated if the time between presentation of 
Trial 1 and Trial 2 is increased. It is predicted that solution rate to the "old" riddles will be 
greater when the participants have been provided with an incubation period. This is 
expected because it is assumed that the activation level o f the incorrect responses will 
decline during the incubation period.
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Experiment 2
In this experiment, participants were presented with the same ten riddles used in 
Experiment 1, in two separate trials. As in Experiment 1, the participants attempted to 
solve one-half o f the experimental riddles on Trial 1. Participants attempted to  solve all of 
the riddles on Trial 2. The second trial was either immediately after Trial 1, or after a 15- 
minute incubation period.
Method
Participants. Participants were 32 University o f New Hampshire undergraduates 
who participated in order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Sixteen 
participants were assigned each o f the two experimental groups.
Materials. Materials used were the same riddles and clue sentences that were used 
in Experiment 1. Additionally, participants completed a paper and pencil version o f the 
Remote Associates Test. This test was comprised o f 50 RAT items. The RAT was 
included only as a filler task for the incubation period, therefore the results o f this test 
were not analyzed.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in an experimental session that 
lasted approximately 45 minutes. All participants first completed Trial 1 o f the riddles. 
This consisted o f the three filler riddles and five o f the experimental riddles. Participants 
were instructed that they would have one minute to type a response to each riddle. As in 
Experiment I , it was stressed that they try to write a response to each riddle. The 
incubation group then was given the paper and pencil RAT test that consisted o f 50 RAT 
items. The test was explained to them and an example was given to ensure that the
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participants understood the procedure. They were given 15 minutes to solve as many of 
the RAT items as possible. The RAT task was presented as a filler task to ensure that 
participants were distracted from working on the riddle responses during the incubation 
period.
The experimenter returned after the 15 minute period and collected the RAT 
papers. Participants were then presented with the ratings task. As in Experiment 1, they 
were asked to read each clue statement carefully and rate it for truthfulness on the 1 to 5 
scale. A brief filler period followed the ratings task, during which the participants were 
asked for their student ID cards and their names and student ID numbers were recorded 
on the attendance sheet. Participants were then presented with Trial 2 of the riddles.
They were instructed that they would receive the riddles that they had attempted to solve 
previously, along with some additional ones. They were told that the sentences that they 
had rated would help them to solve the riddles. To make this point clear, the experimenter 
read the "bald" riddle and its corresponding clue sentence aloud.
The procedure for the no-incubation group was identical to that of the incubation 
group, except that the order o f the administration o f the RAT test and the first trial o f the 
riddles was reversed. In this way, the no-incubation group first completed the RAT, then 
Trial 1 o f the riddles, then the ratings task, and after the filler period, were presented with 
Trial 2 o f the riddles. Therefore, there was approximately a five-minute interval between 
the completion o f the ratings task and the presentation o f Trial 2 riddles for both groups o f 
participants.
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Results
Separate analyses were conducted for Trial 1 and Trial 2 riddles. No significant 
difference was found between the two sets o f Trial 1 riddles. Therefore, these data were 
analyzed together. Means for both trials are shown in Table S. A independent groups t- 
test on Trial 1 data revealed no significant difference between the number o f riddles solved 
by the incubation and no-incubation groups, I (30) = .33, p  = .73.
A one-way ANOVA on Trial 2 data showed no significant difference between the 
incubation and no-incubations groups on number o f riddles solved, E (1, 30) = 2.50, MSe 
= 2.03, p =  .13. An further analysis o f the old/new factor revealed no difference in the 
number o f old and new riddles solved, although this effect did approach significance, E (1, 
30) = 3.00, MSe = .75, p  = .09. The interaction o f group and the old/new factor did not 
approach significance, E (1, 30) = .33, MSe = .75, p  = .57. Simple effects tests showed no 
difference between the old/new factor for the incubation group, 1 (15) = .70, p  = .5. This 
analysis was very close to significant for the no-incubation group, 1(15) = 2.07, p  = .06.
In both cases, participants solved more new items.
Discussion
The purpose o f Experiment 2 was to determine if providing an incubation period 
between the first and second exposures to  the riddles would increase the percentage o f 
riddles solved on the second trial. While the trends were as expected, the statistical 
analysis did not find these trends reliable. Perhaps the most striking aspect o f this finding 
is that Trial 2 solution rate to "old" riddles was no better than Trial 2 solution rate to 
"new" riddles, although the clue sentences were presented after the first attempt to  solve
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Table 5. Mean Solution Percentages for Riddle Trials 1 and 2: Experiment 2
Trial 1 Trial 2
Old New
Condition M SD M SD M SD
Incubation 11.2 10.2 58.8 22.5 63.8 23.0
No Incubation 10.0 10.3 45.0 25.8 55.0 22.5
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the riddles. This might be conceptualized as proactive interference from the Trial 1 
solutions, while previous work has demonstrated retroactive interference effects from 
initial solution to "old" riddles (e.g., Adams et al., 1988; Perfetto et al., 1983). For 
example, in the presort experiment, participants first attempted to solve riddles such as the 
"minister" riddle. After doing so, they read the acquisition sentences that provided the 
solutions to these riddles. If  the participants recognized this relationship as they were 
reading the acquisition sentences, then one might expect the Trial 2 solution rate for "old" 
riddles to be higher than that for "new" riddles, particularly for the no incubation group, 
given that these participants read the clue sentences only several minutes after first 
attempting to solve the problems. However, the no-incubation group solved more "new” 
problems than "old" problems, although this difference was not significant.
This finding o f fixation to  self-generated responses on the riddle task differs from 
previous research using other types o f transfer tasks, such as analogical transfer. For 
example, Duncker (1945) noted that a few o f his participants initially produced solutions 
to the radiation problem that might be considered correct. These included sending the 
radiation through the esophagus, or using a lead shield to protect the surrounding tissue 
from the excess radiation. In contrast to the present finding, Duncker and later 
researchers (e.g., Gick & McGarry, 1992) showed that initial solution failures to these 
types o f problems enhanced subsequent solving o f  the problems.
In the present experiment, it is possible that participants believed their original 
solutions to be correct, even in the incubation condition. This possibility is not as likely in 
the radiation problem, given that the other possible solutions to the radiation problem are
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clearly flawed. In the riddles experiments, it is certainly possible that some participants 
believe that polygamy is legal in Utah. Therefore, their solution to the minister problem 
could seem reasonable to them.
Overall, there seem to be three possibilities for the present finding o f no decrease 
in fixation effects from Trial I to Trial 2 solving, following the incubation period. The 
first is that the participants believed their original solutions to be correct. This possibility 
is supported by a pilot study in which participants were presented with Trial 1 o f the 
riddles after completing the ratings task. Participants were instructed to write a solution 
to each riddle, but only if they were certain that the solution was correct. I f  they were 
unsure if the solution was correct, they were instructed to leave the riddle unanswered. 
The participants in this experiment provided solutions to nearly every riddle, although 
their solution rate was no higher than Experiments 1 and 2 here. This suggests that the 
participants1 confidence for their solutions was very high.
It is also possible that the time allowed for the incubation period was insufficient to 
facilitate a decline in the activation o f the competing response. This could be due to the 
original response being generated by the participants. Previous work has shown that 
information that is self-generated is better recalled than information that is simply read 
(Slamecka & G raf 1978). Providing a much longer incubation period, such as a 24-hour 
period, or even longer, might diminish the participants1 tendency to experience fixation 
from their incorrect responses on Trial 1. Previous researchers have shown that an 
incubation period o f this duration resulted in greater improvement in anagram solution 
rate, versus shorter durations (Goldman et al., 1992).
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Finally, the power to find significant differences might not have been sufficient in 
this experiment. It is possible that a largo' sample size would reveal a significant 
difference between solution rates to "old" riddles for the incubation versus no-incubation 
groups.
While the solution rate to the initially unsolved riddles was not effectively 
increased via an incubation period, it has been shown that an incubation period can result 
in increased solution to other stimulus materials, such as a RAT (Patrick, 1986; Smith & 
Blankenship, 1991). Experiment 3 made use o f the RAT to investigate several questions.
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Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was conducted in an effort to answer two questions. The first was 
whether the suppression task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990) would predict 
performance on the RAT. Such a finding would extend the results o f Experiment 1 to 
show that the suppression task predicts ability on a different problem solving test.
The second objective o f Experiment 3 was to evaluate whether participants can easily 
discard extraneous information when solving the RATs. To this end, the RAT items were 
presented along with additional words that were meant to "block" participants1 access to 
the correct response. This is similar to the procedure that was used by Smith and 
Blankenship (1991). In accordance with Smith and Blankenship's results, it was expected 
that these blockers would diminish participants' ability to solve the RATs, in comparison 
to participants who did not receive the blockers with the RAT items. It was also o f 
interest to determine if the solution rate would increase significantly when participants 
were provided with a second chance to  solve the RAT hems after a period o f incubation. 
Results o f this endeavor were compared to those o f Experiment 2. Perhaps the failure to 
improve solutions to the "old" riddles in Experiment 2 with an incubation period were 
particular to the riddles that were used in that experiment. While the riddles seem to elicit 
firmly entrenched solutions that were not discarded even when participants wore told that 
these solutions were incorrect, it is possible that participants will be better able to 
disregard initial incorrect responses to  the RAT, after being provided an opportunity to 
solve the RAT hems in the absence o f the blockers.
Experiment 3 included three levels o f incubation. The first was a no-incubation
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level, in which participants were presented with each RAT item only once, for a total of 60 
seconds. The first 30 seconds was considered to be the first solution period (RAT 1), and 
the final 30 seconds was the second attempt (RAT 2). The short-incubation condition was 
the second level. In this condition participants attempted all RAT items, then were 
presented with the same items again. The Iong-incubation condition was similar to  the 
short-incubation condition, except that a 10-minute incubation period was interpolated 
between the first and second presentation o f the RAT items. During this period, 
participants were presented with a variation of the Sternberg (1966) letter-search task. 
Method
Participants. Participants were 60 University o f New Hampshire undergraduates 
who participated in order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Ten participants 
were assigned each o f the six experimental groups in a 3 (level o f incubation; no-, short-, 
or Iong-incubation) by 2 (fixation; fixation or no-fixation) design.
Materials. Four tasks were presented to each participant. The first was the 18 
Remote Associates Test (RAT) items (Mednick, 1962). These are shown in Appendix B. 
Each item is made up o f a set o f three words. The task was to produce the fourth word 
that forms a common phrase with each word on the set. The participants were given this 
example; WASHER, SHOPPING, PICTURE. Fixation materials included three distractor 
words that were presented along with each RAT set. The distractors provided for this 
example RAT were; glass, sidewalk, and pane. The solution to this example problem was 
"window." Four random orders o f  presentation o f the RAT items were prepared.
The second task was the suppression measure (Gemsbacher et al., 1990) used in
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Experiment 1. The third task was a pencil and paper version o f the RAT that consisted of 
30 items. Finally, participants in the fixation conditions were presented with a recall test. 
This was composed o f 10 o f the RAT items, presented one at a time. The task was to 
recall as many o f the three distractors as possible for each presented RAT item.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in two sessions. The first session 
was approximately one hour and the second session was approximately 20 minutes. Upon 
arrival at the first session, the participants were randomly assigned to one o f the six 
experimental groups. Three o f the groups were fixation conditions and three were no­
fixation conditions.
The were three fixation conditions, which were divided according to the length o f 
the incubation period that was interpolated between the first and second presentation o f 
the RAT items. The first condition was a no-incubation condition, in which each RAT 
item was presented for 30 seconds with the three distractors. This was followed 
immediately by a 30-second presentation o f the same RAT item without the distractors. 
The short-incubation group completed all 18 RAT items with distractors. After all 18 
items were presented, the same items were presented again, in the same order. On this 
second presentation the distractors were not presented. Please note that this was the 
procedure that Smith and Blankenship (1991) referred to as their "no-incubation" 
condition. The final RAT condition was the Iong-incubation condition. These participants 
completed all 18 RATs with distractors. They then worked on an absorbing letter-search 
task (Sternberg, 1966) for a period o f 10 minutes. The second presentation o f the RATs, 
without distractors, followed this incubation period. AO experimental RAT items were
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presented for a total o f 60 seconds. For all groups, RAT 1 was the first 30-second 
presentation o f the hems and RAT 2 was the second 30-second presentation.
The no-fixation groups were divided in a similar fashion. The no-incubation group 
was presented with each RAT hem for a total o f 60 seconds. The first 30 seconds was 
considered as RAT 1, and the second 30 seconds was recorded as RAT 2. The short- 
incubation group completed all 18 RAT hems. They were then presented with all hems 
again. The Iong-incubation group completed the 18 RATs, worked on the letter searching 
task for 10 minutes, then were presented with RAT 2.
The experimental RAT hems were presented on a Macintosh SE computer. Each 
three-word RAT hem was presented on a separate page. In the fixation conditions, the 
RATs were presented along with the three distractor words. Fixation participants were 
shown this example item: WASHER, SHOPPING, PICTURE, along with the clues: 
"glass," sidewalk," and "pane" printed beneath their corresponding RAT word (see 
Appendix). Participants were instructed that their task was to think o f a fourth word that 
formed a common phrase with each o f the three words in the set. They were also told that 
the clue words were provided to make the task easier for them. It was explained to 
participants that the clues were very similar to the correct answer.
Participants were further instructed that each RAT item would be presented for 30 
seconds and that they should type their response as soon as they knew it, in a box 
provided at the bottom o f each page. They were told to spend the entire 30 seconds 
working on each item. That is, that they were not to press the return key unless they had 
typed in their response. Incubation participants were not informed that they would be
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retested. No-incubation participants were told that they would receive each RAT item for 
a total o f 60 seconds, with the first 30 seconds including the "clues," and that the second 
30 seconds would contain only the three RAT words.
Participants in the no-fixations conditions were given similar instructions. All were 
shown the example RAT and its solution to ensure that they understood the task before 
beginning. The no-incubation group was told that each RAT item would be presented for 
60 seconds. Participants in the two incubation conditions were not informed that they 
would be retested.
Following RATs 1 and 2, the fixation participants were presented with the recall 
task. This task was comprised of 10 o f the RAT items, presented without distractors.
Each item was presented individually. Participants were shown the example RAT item 
(WASHER, SHOPPING, PICTURE) and were reminded o f the distractors that had been 
presented in this example. They were told that they would be presented with some o f the 
sets o f RATs that they had just completed and that their task was to recall the three clue 
words that had been presented along with each RAT on the first presentation. Participants 
were provided with as much time as necessary to type in as many of the clues as they 
could recall.
The final test administered in Session 1 was the pencil and paper version o f the 
RAT. Participants were given 15 minutes to solve as many o f the 30 RAT items as 
possible.
Session 2 consisted o f a single task. This was the suppression task that was used 
in Experiment 1. The materials and procedure for this task were identical to those detailed
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in Experiment 1. This session lasted approximately 20 minutes.
Results
RAT 1 and RAT 2 Solution Rates. Data from RAT 1 and RAT 2 were analyzed 
separately. A 2 (fixation) x 3 (incubation) ANOVA was conducted on RAT 1 solution 
rate. This analysis showed a significant main effect o f fixation, with higher solution rate 
for the no-fixation groups, E (1, 54) = 30.5, MSe = 5.35. Neither the main effect o f 
incubation, E (2, 54) = .07, MSe = 5.35, nor the interaction, E (2, 54) = .53, MSe = 5.35, 
o f the two factors approached significance. Mean solution percentages for all groups are 
given in Table 6.
A 2 (fixation) x 3 (incubation) ANOVA was conducted on RAT 2 solution rate. 
This also revealed a significantly higher solution rate for the no-fixation groups, E (1, 54)
= 9.06, MSe = 7.53. The main effect o f incubation did not reach significance, E (2, 54) = 
2.35, MSe = 7.53. The interaction o f fixation and incubation did not approach 
significance, E (2, 54) = .39, MSe = 7.53.
Improvement Effects. An analysis o f improvement effects was conducted to 
determine if there were differences in improvements in solution rates between the various 
conditions. Improvement was defined for each participant as the number o f RAT items 
solved on RAT 2 that were not solved on RAT 1. A 2 (fixation) x 3 (incubation) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect o f fixation, with the fixated groups demonstrating greater 
improvement, E (1, 54) = 10.5, MSe = 1.95. The main effect o f incubation was also 
significant, with the groups that had an incubation period between presentations o f each 
RAT item showing greater improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2, E (2, 54) = 10.3, MSe =
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Table 6. Mean Solution Percentages for RATs 1 and 2: Experiment 3
Condition
RAT I RAT 2
M SD M SD Improvement
No Fixation
No Inc 38.3 10.9 43.9 10.9 5.6
Short Inc 42.8 19.4 53.9 19.6 11.1
Long Inc 38.9 10.6 50.6 11.2 11.7
Fixation
No Inc 23.9 7.9 31.1 11.7 7.2
Short Inc 20.0 11.6 38.3 16.0 18.3
Long Inc 21.1 10.8 43.3 15.3 22.2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
1.95. The interaction o f these two factors did not reach significance, E (2, 54) = 1.68, 
MSe = 1.95.
One-way ANOVAs were conducted comparing the three incubation durations for 
both the fixation and no-fixation conditions. For the no-fixation condition, this analysis 
revealed no significant differences in improvement for the no-, short-, and Iong-incubation 
groups, E (2, 28) = 1.90, MSe = 1.95. A significant effect was revealed between the three 
fixation conditions, E (2, 28) = 10.1, MSe = 1.95. Planned comparisons showed that the 
no-incubation group had lower improvement than both the short-incubation, t  (28) = 3.21, 
and the Iong-incubation groups, 1 (28) = 4.33. The short- and Iong-incubation groups did 
not differ in the degree o f improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2, i  (28) =1.12.
Suppression and Problem Solving Ability. Also o f interest was the relationship 
between performance on the inhibition task and solution rate on the RAT task.
Participants were defined as high, medium, or low ability problem solvers based on their 
scores on the pencil and paper rat. High ability participants were those who scored above 
the median. Medium ability participants scored at the median, and low ability participants 
scored below the median. This division resulted in 23 high-ability, 14 medium-ability, and 
23 low-ability participants. Means for these groups are shown in Table 7.
A 3 (problem solving ability) x 2 (level o f ambiguity) ANOVA was conducted.
Due to attrition, inhibition data were available for only 52 participants; 21 high-ability, 13 
medium-ability, and 18 low-ability participants. Separate analyses were carried out for the 
850 ms delay and the 100 ms delay conditions. Results o f the 100 ms condition will be 
reported first.
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Table 7. Mean Reaction Times for High- and Low-Ability RAT solvers at 100 and 850 
ms Delays: Experiment 3
Delay Interval
100 ms 850 ms
Ability Ambig Unambig Diff Ambig Unambig Diff
High 768 728 40 682 673 9
Medium 806 783 23 777 768 9
Low 918 831 87 881 784 97
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This analysis showed a main effect o f group, E (2, 49) = 3.63, MSe = 43,167. The 
main effect for ambiguity was also significant, with the response times for the 
unambiguous target words being faster than for the ambiguous targets, E (1,49) = 35.7, 
MSe = 1,759. The interaction o f these factors was also significant, E (2, 49) = 5.25.
Simple effects tests showed that the high-and low-ability groups had significant 
differences between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at this delay, i  (20) = 
3.21, and t (17) = 5.34, respectively. There was no difference for the medium-ability 
group, 1(12) = 1.85.
An analysis o f the data from the 850 ms condition showed a significant main effect 
o f group, with the E (2, 49) = 5.96, MSe = 39,941. There was a significant main effect o f 
ambiguity, with foster reaction times recorded for the unambiguous condition, E (1, 49) = 
21.1, MSe = 1,745. The interaction between ability level and ambiguity was also 
significant, E (2, 49) = 12.9, MSe = 1, 745.
Simple effects tests showed that only the low-ability group showed a difference in 
reaction times between the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions at this delay, t  (17) = 
5.87. The high-ability group showed no difference, I (20) = .71. The medium-ability 
group also showed no difference, 1 (12) = .94.
Regression analysis. A multiple regression was performed using score on the 
paper version of the RAT as the dependent variable. As in Experiment 1, the two 
predictor variables were the difference scores between the ambiguous and unambiguous 
conditions and the average o f the ambiguous and unambiguous conditions. This analysis 
was conducted for the data in the 850 ms delay condition. Results showed that the two
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variables together accounted for 28.6% o f the variance (25.7 adjusted). Both variables 
contributed significantly to the regression, t (49) = 2.77, and t (49) = 2.25 for the average 
and difference variables, respectively.
Improvement Effects and Problem Solving Ability. To examine the effect o f the 
incubation periods on RAT solution for participants o f varying ability levels, scores on the 
pencil and paper RAT were used to predict improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2. For this 
analysis, data from the 40 participants in the two incubation groups were used. This 
division yielded 16 high-ability, 8 medium-ability, and 16 low-ability participants. A one­
way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the groups, E (2, 37) = 5.26, MSe 
= 2.63. Pairwise comparisons showed that the only significant difference was that the 
high-ability solvers showed greater improvement scores than the low-ability group, i  (37) 
= 2.95. No other paired comparison approached significance. Means are given in Table 
8 .
Distractor Memory. Data from the recall task were analyzed for the fixation 
groups. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the three groups, E 
(2, 27) =16.7, MSe = 13.87. Planned comparisons showed that the no-incubation group 
recalled significantly more o f the distractors than the two incubation groups, 1 (27) = 4.55, 
1 (27) = 5.33, for the difference between the no-incubation group and the short-incubation 
group, and between no-incubation and Iong-incubation group, respectively. Means for the 
three groups are given in Table 9. Thus, these results parallel those comparing 
improvement effects between the three groups. Here, it is shown that the continuation o f 
the fixation effect in the no-incubation condition, that is; no improvement, is accompanied
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Table 8. Mean Improvement for High-, Medium-, and Low-AbOity RAT Solvers: 
Experiment 3.
Incubation Effect
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Table 9. Mean Distractors Recalled in No-, Short-, and Long-Incubation Conditions.
Distractors Recalled
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by a high availability o f the blocking information, compared to that for the two incubation 
conditions.
P isCUSSipn
Results of Experiment 3 extend those o f the previous experiments in several 
important ways. Most importantly, the suppression task proved useful in predicting 
problem solving ability, as measured by the RAT. This strengthens the finding o f a 
relationship between the suppression task and the riddle solving task in Experiment 1. The 
finding further supports Gemsbacher et al.'s (1990) claim that their suppression task has 
value as a tool for predicting general cognitive abilities. It can be concluded that the 
suppression task is a reliable indicator o f both o f these problem solving skills.
Additionally, the overall speed o f response to the ambiguous and unambiguous words 
predicted success on the RAT.
The present results contrast with those o f the first two experiments, with regard to 
the diminishing of fixation effects. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the fixating effects o f the 
initial incorrect responses was evident at re-testing both immediately (Experiment 1), and 
after a period of incubation (Experiment 2). In contrast, the distracting information 
provided in Experiment 3 had a short-lived effect. This can be seen by comparing the 
improvement on RAT 2 for the no-incubation participants versus the incubation 
participants. While the no-incubation participants, both fixated and non-fixated, showed 
virtually no improvement from RAT 1 to RAT 2, all other groups did demonstrate 
increased solution rate. This increase in solution rate for the incubation conditions is 
especially important in the non-fixation groups, because it suggests that participants do
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become "fixated" on some incorrect response, whether this response is experimentally 
provided, or is generated by the participant. In both the fixation and non-fixation RAT 
conditions, participants were able to discard this incorrect information during the 
incubation period, as shown by significantly higher solution rate for RAT 2 versus RAT I.
Finally, the present experiment confirmed expectations that the high-ability 
problem solvers would benefit most greatly from the incubation interval. This is contrary 
to Smith and Blankenship's (1991) findings with the same materials, but does support 
other incubation research (Patrick, 1986). The present assumption is that high ability 
participants were better able to make use o f the incubation period as a means o f discarding 
incorrect, blocking responses. Upon returning to the problems, these high ability 
participants did not re-access the responses that they generated, or were provided to them, 
on the first solution attempt.
It is possible that one reason for the high-ability solvers showing greater incubation 
effects is that the problems were simply too difficult for the low-ability participants. If 
incubation is defined as an increase in the solution rate o f solvable problems after a period 
away from the problems, then the problems must be within the domain o f knowledge o f all 
participants. Experiment 4 will examine this issue by using a procedure similar to  that of 
Experiment 3, with the most difficult RAT items replaced with easier items.
A further question for Experiment 4 concerns the degree to  which the effect o f the 
blockers can be controlled by participants. In Experiment 3, the participants were 
explicitly instructed to attend to the fixators because they would help them solve the 
problems. It is likely that some participants realized that the blockers were not helping
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
them to solve the problems. Several participants reported this phenomenon. However, it 
seems that the participants were not able to avoid attending to the blockers. This is 
supported by the observation that the participants fared no better in solving the last 9 
items than in solving the first 9. If  they did decide to ignore the "clues," they did not do so 
successfully. An alternative possibility is that participants did not actively attempt to avoid 
the clues.
Experiment 4 examined these possibilities by instructing some participants that the 
distractor words were meant to be distracting and that they should attend only to the 
words o f interest. This manipulation allowed me to determine the extent to which the 
instructions that the "distractors" are helpful, and therefore should be attended to, 
contributed the fixation effect. This "ignore" condition was compared to participants who 
were told to attend to the information. It was o f interest to determine whether the 
solution rate for the "ignore" participants would be significantly greater than for the 
"attend" participants.
This inquiry was instigated from the results o f the first three experiments. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were unable to reject previously-generated responses. 
However, in Experiment 3, participants were able to overcome the fixating effects of the 
previously-presented distractors, as shown by increased solution rate on Rat 2. This 
suggests that the fixating effect o f the distractors in Experiment 3 might be partially due to 
the instructions that these "distractors” would be helpful to solution, rather than 
exclusively to the mere presence o f the distractors. In Experiment 3, participants attended 
to the distractors voluntarily. This is in contrast to the usual way that distracting
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information reduces retrieval rate. For example, when experiencing a tip-of-the-tongue 
state (TOT), participants are actively trying to reduce the activation of (i.e., ignore) the 
interloper (Jones, 1989), but are unable to do so.
A final objective o f Experiment 4 was to show that instructions to attend to or 
ignore extraneous information can result in positive or negative impact on solution rate, 
dependent upon the usefulness o f this extraneous information. Specifically, it will be 
determined if instructions to ignore the information can actually decrease solution rate, if 
that information provides a useful clue for solving the RAT item. Such a finding would 
further support the theory that instructions exert a substantial effect on performance on 
the RAT task. In this case, strategies to ignore the clues can be effectively implemented 
by the participants. The method for testing this theory is outlined below.
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Experiment 4
This final experiment was designed to investigate three major questions. The first 
was the degree to which it is possible to exert control over the effects o f distractors, (i.e., 
ignore the distractors) when those distractors are known to be detrimental to solution o f 
the RAT hems. This was accomplished by presenting participants with a RAT procedure 
similar to that used in Experiment 3, with several modifications. The most substantial o f 
these was that some participants were told that the words accompanying the RAT items 
were meant to be distracting and therefore, that they should ignore those words when 
solving the RATs.
A second purpose was to determine whether the instructions to ignore the 
distractors could prove to be detrimental to solution, when the distractors actually 
provided useful clues. To this end, the final five RAT items, out o f a total o f 20, were 
accompanied by clues that were helpful to solution. These items each contained one 
"distractor" that was very similar to the solution. For example, the RAT hem: SKATE, 
PICK, WATER was accompanied by the words: blade, choose, and bath. The last two o f 
these words are the same distractors that were used in Experiment 3. The first word, 
blade, was helpful to  solution because together, "skate," and "blade" are very similar to the 
solution word, "ice". If  participants were successfully ignoring the accompanying words, 
then it would not be expected that those who received these helpful dues would perform 
better than partidpants who received distracting words on these five RAT hems.
The third purpose was similar to the second. In this case, h was of interest to 
determine how well partidpants who were instructed to attend to the distractor words
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would make use o f the five helpful clues. The procedure was identical to that described 
above, except that the participants were instructed to attend to the words accompanying 
the RAT items because these words would aid them in solving the items. This was the 
same procedure followed in Experiment 3. As described above, the final five RAT items 
were accompanied by the helpful clues. It was expected that the participants who received 
the helpful clues on these items would be able to make use o f the clues, and solve more o f 
these items than would the participants who received distracting words on the final five 
RAT items.
Method
Participants. Participants were SO University o f New Hampshire undergraduates 
who participated in order to receive credit for Introductory Psychology. Ten participants 
were assigned to each o f the four experimental groups, and ten participants made up the 
control group.
Materials. Materials were similar to the RAT items used in Experiment 3. The 
most difficult item was dropped from the set and replaced with an easier item, based on 
pilot testing. Two additional items o f low difficulty were added, for a total o f 20 RAT 
items in this experiment. These materials are included in Appendix C. There were two 
attend groups: Helpful-Attend (HA) and Distracting-Attend (DA). These participants 
were instructed to attend to the "clues" because they would help them solve the problems. 
These were the same instructions given to  participants in Experiment 3. In the HA 
condition, the first 15 RAT items were accompanied by distracting "chies." The last 5 
items were accompanied by helpful clues. In the DA condition, all 20 o f the
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accompanying "clues" were distractors. There were two ignore conditions: Helpful- 
Ignore (HI) and Distracting-Ignore (DI). The ignore participants were told that the words 
accompanying the RAT items were meant to be distracting and therefore, that they should 
try to avoid them when solving the RAT items. In the HI condition, the first 15 RATs 
were accompanied by truly distracting distractors, while the last 5 were accompanied by 
helpful "distractors." In the DI condition, all 20 o f the RAT items were accompanied by 
distracting words. The control condition was the same as that in Experiment 3, with the 
participants receiving only the RAT items without distractors on both experimental trials. 
Thus, there were five groups o f participants: HA, DA, HL, DI, and control.
Other materials were similar to those used in Experiment 3. These included the 
recall test for the participants in the four distractor conditions, and the paper and pencil 
RAT for all participants.
Procedure. All participants received two trials o f the RAT items. Participants in 
the attend conditions were instructed that the distractor words would help them to solve 
the RATs and that they should pay attention to these words. The example given was the 
same "window" example used in Experiment 3. The only difference between the HA and 
the DA conditions was in the last S items. In the HA conditions, the last 5 distractor items 
were helpful to solving the RATs, while these items were not helpful in the DA condition. 
This same distinction applied between the HI and DI conditions. In these ignore 
conditions, participants were told that the accompanying words were intended to distract 
the participants from solving the RATs and that they should try their best to attend only to 
the RAT words when solving the items. The control participants received the RAT items
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without any clues. All participants had 30 seconds to type their response on RAT 1. They 
were again instructed to spend the entire 30 seconds trying to solve the each item.
On RAT 2, all participants received only the RAT items, without distractors. RAT 
2 was presented immediately after the participants completed all items in RAT 1. Because 
there were no differences found between the short-incubation and long-incubation 
conditions in Experiment 3, RAT 2 was considered to be an incubation condition.
The recall and pencil and paper RAT procedures were the same as described in 
Experiment 3.
Results
RAT 1 and RAT 2 Solution Data. Data from RAT 1 and RAT 2 were analyzed 
separately. Within the RAT 1 analysis, the first 15 RAT items and the final 5 items were 
analyzed separately. These separate analyses were conducted because the first 15 items 
were the same for both attend groups and both ignore groups. The final 5 hems differed 
between the groups, in terms o f the usefulness o f the "distractors."
A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the first 15 items, for the attend, ignore, 
and control groups. This analysis revealed a significant effect, E (2,47) = 7.83, MSe = 
3.89. Planned comparisons showed a significant difference between the attend and control 
groups, t  (47) = 3.60, with the control group solving significantly more o f the RAT 1 
hems. The analysis between the attend and ignore groups also reached significance, 1 (47) 
= 2.97, with the ignore group solving more hems than the attend group. The analysis 
revealed no difference between the ignore and control groups, t  (47) =1.18. Means are 
presented in Table 10.
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A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the data from the final five items on RAT 
1, between the 5 experimental conditions: control, HA, DA, HI, and DI. This analysis 
revealed a  significant effect, E (4, 45) = 4.23, MSe = .74. Pairwise comparisons using the 
Newman-Keuls procedure showed that this effect was due to the poor performance o f the 
DA group. The solution rate for the DA group was significantly lower than all other 
groups. For DA vs DI, I (45) = 3.65, for DA vs control, 1 (45) = 3.13, for DA vs HI, t  
(45) = 3.13, and for DA vs H A  I (45) = 2.86.
RAT 2 data were also analyzed with a one-way ANOVA that compared solution 
rates for the five experimental groups. This analysis revealed no significant differences 
between the groups, E (4,45) = 1.56, MSe = 6.56, p  = .20. Means are given in Table 10.
Improvement Effects. As in Experiment 3, improvement was defined for each 
participant as the total number o f RAT items solved on RAT 2 that were not solved on 
RAT 1. A one-way ANOVA between the control, attend, and ignore groups revealed a 
significant effect, E (2, 47) = 6.82, MSe = 1.79. Planned comparisons showed that 
improvement was greater for the attend group than for the control group, 1 (47) = 3.67. 
The difference between the ignore group and the control group did not reach significance, 
i  (47) = 2.12, p =  .12. Comparison between the attend and ignore groups did not 
approach significance, 1 (47) = 1.34. Means are provided in Table 11.
Distractor Memory. A t-test compared the percentage of distractors recalled by 
the attend participants and the ignore participants. This revealed a significant difference, 
with the attend participants recalling more o f the distractors, t  (38) = 3.88. Means are 
presented in Table 12.
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Table 10. Mean Solution Percentages for RATs 1 and 2: Experiment 4
RAT 1 RAT 2
1st 15 Last 5 Total
Condition M SD M SD M SD
HA 21.3 14.0 44.0 18.4 47.5 12.5
DA 24.7 10.5 22.0 14.8 44.0 11.5
HI 36.0 11.0 46.0 21.2 56.0 9.1
DI 34.7 14.7 50.0 14.1 54.5 15.1
Control 40.0 16.3 46.0 16.5 53.0 14.8
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Improvement Effects and Ability Level. Scores on the pencil and paper RAT were 
used to classify participants as high-, medium- or low-ability RAT solvers. High-ability 
participants were those who scored above the median, medium-ability participants scored 
at the median, and low-ability participants scored below the median. This resulted in 16 
high-ability, 7 medium-ability, and 17 low-ability participants. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed no differences in the improvement scores for these three groups, F (2, 47) = 1.90, 
MSe = 2.40. Means are presented in Table 13.
V
Discussion
There were two major findings o f interest in Experiment 4. The first concerns the 
performance o f the participants in the ignore conditions. These participants exhibited 
solution rates that were significantly higher than those o f the attend group, but not lower 
than those o f the control group. This suggests that the fixation effects demonstrated in 
Experiment 3 were not due exclusively to the presence o f the distracting information. 
Rather, this study suggests that the distractors, coupled with the instructions to attend to 
them, served to prevent participants from performing as well as the control group on the 
RAT task.
This conclusion is supported by the results o f the recall task. In this task, attend 
participants recalled significantly more o f the distractors than did the ignore participants. 
This suggests that participants in the ignore group were somewhat successful in their 
attempts to ignore the extraneous words, at least as indicated by their explicit memory for 
these words. This finding raises an interesting question concerning the method by which 
participants process the distracting stimuli. The knowledge that an extraneous stimulus
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was not appropriate for solution was sufficient to diminish the effect o f that stimulus.
That is, participants were able to  successfully ignore the information when they were 
aware that the information would not be helpful to them. Therefore, Smith and 
Blankenship's (1991) results, as well as the results o f Experiment 3 can be said to be partly 
due to the instructions that participants were given; that is, to exploit the distractors to 
find solutions to the RAT items.
This finding demonstrates a fundamental difference between Smith and 
Blankenship's (1991) blocking procedure and what actually takes place when we find 
ourselves unable to retrieve a known piece o f information. For example, when we 
experience a TOT, the mere knowledge that the interloper that has been accessed is 
incorrect does not make it possible to reduce the activation level o f that interloper (e.g., 
Jones, 1989; Jones & Langford, 1987).
The present finding can be compared to the results of Experiments 1 and 2. In 
those experiments, the fixating effects o f the incorrect riddle responses continued to exert 
an effect on later solution attempts, both in the short-term (Experiment 1) and after an 
incubation period (Experiment 2). In these riddles, the participants themselves generated 
the incorrect responses. This is in contrast to the RAT example, in which the incorrect 
responses were provided experimentally.
Also with respect to the topic o f incubation, the present experiment found no 
differences in the degree to which participants o f varying ability levels benefited from the 
incubation period to improve the number o f RATs solved on Trial 2. This is in contrast to 
Experiment 3, in which the high-and medium-ability participants showed an advantage to
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the low-ability solvers in this regard. This might be accounted for in two ways. First, the 
task performed in Experiment 4 was generally easier than that in Experiment 3, given that 
the ignore participants were quite capable o f ignoring the distractors. Therefore, these 
participants solved more RAT items on Trial 1. Subsequently, there was an overall 
decrease in the amount o f improvement on RAT 2 for the ignore participants, compared to 
those in the attend group. Second, there was a decrease in the difficulty level o f the RAT 
rtems from Experiment 3 to Experiment 4. This also made the task easier. This is 
especially important, in light o f research in social psychology demonstrating that positive 
feedback can improve scores on the RAT (e.g., Fodor & Greenier, 1995), particularly for 
individuals who have already been identified as having high ability for the task. Based on 
this research, it might be the case that the low-ability participants in Experiment 3 became 
discouraged by their poor performance on the RAT items, which might have served to 
further diminish their performance.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments were conducted to investigate several primary 
hypotheses. The first o f these was the supposition that suppression efficiency is part o f a 
general cognitive mechanism. Previous research by Gemsbacher and colleagues (e.g., 
Gemsbacher & Faust, 1991; Gemsbacher et al. 1990) has shown that suppression 
efficiency is predictive o f comprehension ability. Further, they have demonstrated that this 
suppression mechanism operates on nonlinguistic as well as linguistic tasks. Based on 
their findings, these researchers predicted that suppression skill underlies a variety o f 
cognitive abilities.
In Experiment 1, it was revealed that spontaneous transfer and informed transfer 
abilities are related to suppression efficiency. This is significant because it extends the 
previous work of Gemsbacher and associates to the realm o f problem solving. Thus, it 
supports the claim that suppression skill is a part of cognitive abilities as a whole. Further, 
Experiment 3 showed that ability on another problem solving task, the Remote Associates 
Test, is also related to suppression skill. That these problem solving tasks are related is 
not surprising, if both are considered as measures of individuals' ability to draw 
associations between sources o f information that do not seem to be immediately related. 
For example, in order to solve the riddles in Experiment 1, participants had to recognize
104
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the relevance o f the previously-presented sentences. This was true in both the informed 
and uninformed conditions. Similarly, the RAT measures the ability to draw associations 
between words that are not obviously related to each other. That is, each o f the three 
words in a RAT item is related to the two other words only through its connection to the 
fourth, unpresented, word. Because three RAT words are not directly related to each 
other in any way that is useful to solution, participants must disregard any immediate 
connection that any given pair o f the words might share, and instead direct their search to 
some remote word.
This process is very similar to what is involved in accessing the solution to the 
riddles. For example, to solve the minister riddle, one must look beyond the obvious 
meaning o f the word, "marry" and instead access the less common meaning o f this word. 
Once this is accomplished, the solution to the riddle is clear. Each of the riddles requires a 
similar procedure to obtain solution. These results nicely complement Simonton's (1988) 
conjecture that the ability to draw associations between remotely related concepts is 
especially high in individuals who generate random permutations o f mental associations. 
Because they randomly shift focus, these individuals do not perseverate on habitual 
associations between concepts, thus allowing access to  atypical connections between 
words. Such an ability would certainly facilitate access to both the riddle and RAT 
solutions. These accessing processes can also be compared to those that have previously 
been shown to be related to suppression skill, such as solving a pun (Gemsbacher & 
Robertson, 1995), or comprehending riddles (Fowles &  d an z , 1977; Yuill & Oakhill, 
1991).
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In sum, the suppression task devised by Gemsbacher et al. (1990) proved to be 
effective in distinguishing between partidpants who were high- or low- skilled problem 
solvers. Thus, the present experiments have extended Gemsbacher et al's construct o f a 
general suppression mechanism to  the skill o f problem solving. Further, this finding adds 
to previous research in problem solving that has investigated the differences between 
individuals who vary in the ability to make use o f base analogs in studies o f analogical 
transfer (Chen, 1995; Gick & Hoiyoak, 1980, 1983;Novick, 1988). Specifically, the 
present findings suggest that skilled suppressors are able to make use o f the similarities 
between the acquisition sentences and the riddles, although there was very little surface 
overlap between the two sources o f information.
A second central theme o f the present dissertation was that o f the attenuation o f 
fixation effects in problem solving. Results o f the riddle and RAT procedures yielded 
differential results in this regard. While participants easily overcame their fixation to the 
artificial blockers provided in the RAT procedures (Experiments 3 and 4), there was no 
such recovery from fixation to the participant-generated solutions to the riddles in 
Experiments 1 and 2. These findings are interpreted in light o f the generation effect 
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978), which states that information that is generated by a participant 
is better remembered than information that is experimentally provided to the participant.
This result can be contrasted with work in analogical transfer that has shown that 
solution failures can actually improve performance on later-presented problems (e.g., 
Duncker, 1945; Gick & McGarry, 1992; Needham & Begg, 1991; Ross, 1984; Ross & 
Kennedy, 1990). Needham and Begg (1991) showed that partidpants' failed attempts to
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solve a base analog to the radiation problem resulted in higher solution rate to the 
radiation problem, compared to  participants who only read the base problem, but did not 
attempt to solve it. Perfetto et al. (1987) showed the opposite effect using the insight 
riddles. Participants who attempted to solve the riddles on an initial uninformed trial 
performed less well on a subsequent informed trial than participants who simply read the 
incorrect solutions in the uninformed trial. The present results are consistent with this 
finding. It seems likely that participants1 failure to solve "old" riddles in the informed 
condition resulted from some combination o f having generated the incorrect responses 
themselves, and a misguided perception that these solutions were the appropriate answers.
While this account effectively explains the results o f Experiment 1, the results o f 
Experiment 2 are more elusive. Past research has shown that the introduction o f an 
incubation period can serve to reduce the activation effect o f incorrect information and 
thus, result in increased solution rates on problems such as the RAT (Patrick, 1986; Smith 
& Blankenship, 1991) and anagrams (Goldman et al., 1992; Peterson, 1974), as well as on 
reminiscence effects (Smith & Vela, 1991). Unlike initial incorrect responses in these 
experiments, incorrect responses to the riddles were not alleviated during the incubation 
period. It is possible that introducing a longer period between successive solution 
attempts might result in an incubation effect with the riddles. Previous research has 
demonstrated that incubation effects are more dramatic after a 24-hour interval than after 
a duration o f 20 minutes (e.g., Goldman et al., 1992). Further research might make use o f 
this procedure to determine whether the fixation to self-generated solutions to the riddles 
would be similarly decreased.
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A final issue regarding the riddles is whether the participants "caught on" to the 
relevance o f the clue sentences at some point during the uninformed phase o f riddle 
solution. Previous researchers have adhered to this account (e.g., Lockart et al., 1988; 
Ross et al., 1989). Alternatively, others have suggested that participants do not "catch 
on," but rather, they access the necessary information, but are not aware that this transfer 
has taken place (Landrum, 1990; Maier, 1931; Perfetto et al., 1983). For example, Maier 
presented participants with the two-string problem. As a clue to solution o f the problem, 
he "accidentally” brushed by the rope, causing it to  swing. Although solution rate to the 
two-string problem increased after this hint, participants did not mention this incident 
when describing how they came to their solution. To the contrary, participants most often 
reported that the solution "just came to them." This result, which might be referred to as 
the "insight" solution, was replicated by Landrum (1990).
In contrast, Ross et al. (1989), found convincing evidence for the "catching on" 
position. They presented participants with the riddles previously used by Perfetto et al. 
(1983). A majority o f participants reported that they became aware o f the relationship 
between the riddles and the acquisition sentences during uninformed solution o f the 
riddles. In a postexperimental questionnaire, Ross e t al. asked participants to specify the 
riddle that they were working on when they made this realization. An analysis o f the 
response rate on this trial showed that solution rates increased after this connection was 
reported to have been made. That is, participants solved more riddles in the uninformed 
condition after the first riddle in which they reported that they noticed the relevance o f the 
sentences to the riddles.
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The present set o f experiments does not settle this dispute. However, it is likely 
that the "bald" riddle did serve as a cue as to the relevance o f the sentences to the riddles. 
A simple method o f testing this possibility in the future would be to  provide only one 
group o f uninformed participants with the bald riddle on Trial 1. I f  this riddle served the 
purpose stated above, the participants who receive the bald riddle on Trial 1 will show 
greater increases in Trial 2 solution rate than participants who are not provided with this 
cue.
In comparison to the outcome o f the riddle experiments, results o f Experiments 3 
and 4 showed that fixation to experimentally-induced distractors is more easily overcome. 
In Experiment 3, participants who initially attempted to solve the RAT items with the 
distractors present experienced difficulty in solving, in comparison to  control participants 
who had no distractors. However, solution rate for fixated participants increased 
substantially on RAT 2 when no distractors were present, although these participants did 
not increase to the level o f control participants on RAT 2. This result was replicated in 
Experiment 4 for the "attend" participants.
Experiment 4 more closely examined the process by which the distractors exerted 
their effects in Experiment 3. Comparison between the attend and ignore participants on 
RAT 1 revealed that the ignore participants solved significantly more RAT items than did 
the attend participants. This suggests that the detrimental effects o f  the distractors in 
Experiment 3 were due in large part to the instructions that participants attended to the 
distractors because they thought they would be helpful to solution. When told to ignore 
these distractors in Experiment 4, participants were able to do so. This draws a distinction
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between the usual effects o f distracting information in everyday problem solving and the 
somewhat contrived distractors used here. In normal problem solving, such as when a 
TOT state occurs, fixation to a distracting stimulus is not so easily overcome. Attempting 
to  disregard an incorrect word often serves to  strengthen the fixating effect o f that word. 
Nonetheless, it can be concluded that "attend" groups in Experiments 3 and 4 experienced 
fixation to  the distractors, and that this fixation was mitigated by the introduction o f an 
incubation period.
Results o f the relative effectiveness o f an incubation period for individuals o f 
varying ability levels were inconclusive. Experiment 3 showed greater incubation effects 
for the high-skilled problem solvers, replicating Patrick's (1986) findings, but contrasting 
with Smith and Blankenship's (1991) results. Experiment 4 revealed no differences in the 
incubation effect for participants o f varying RAT solution abilities. Although this result is 
disappointing, it is not out of step with previous incubation research, some o f which has 
shown benefits to high-ability problem solvers (Patrick, 1986; Smith & Blankenship, 1991, 
Experiment 5), and other work that has shown that poor problem solvers benefit more 
from incubation periods (Murray & Denny, 1969; Smith & Blankenship, 1991, Experiment
I).
This controversy is only fueled by the present findings. It is possible to conjecture 
as to the basis for the differential incubation results in Experiments 3 and 4. It is possible 
that the incubation period did not prove as helpful in Experiment 4 because the 
participants were able to successfully ignore the distractors on RAT 1. Therefore, 
solution rates on RAT 1 were not hindered by the presence o f the distractors to the degree
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that RAT 1 solutions were depressed in Experiment 3. Such a process would render the 
incubation period less useful because participants solved more problems on RAT 1. 
Comparison o f the RAT 1 solution rates between Experiments 3 and 4 supports this 
possibility.
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Conclusions
The present experimental materials examined one o f the oldest issues in cognitive 
research, that o f the influence o f past experience on problem solving performance. The 
relative effect o f a domain o f knowledge has intrigued investigators since Thorndike 
(1898) placed cats in his puzzle box. The present experiments made use o f materials that 
were certainly within the domain o f knowledge o f participants, given that all participants 
are aware o f the solutions to the insight riddles, as well as to the common phrases formed 
in the RAT items. Thus, performance is not dependent solely on possession o f such 
knowledge, but is also greatly affected by diverse factors, such as the ability to access that 
information when necessary, the ability to ignore irrelevant information, and skill in 
suppressing inappropriate word meanings.
Further, these experiments showed that fixation effects can be attenuated under 
certain circumstances, but that these effects can be quite enduring in other instances.
These differential findings seem to be resultant o f the type of problems that are presented, 
as well as the method by which blocking is induced. Specifically, it was shown that 
fixation to superficial distractors can be effectively overcome, in that such distractors were 
easily ignored. However, distractors that are generated by the participants are more 
difficult to surmount. In fact, the procedures used in these experiments did not result in 
attenuation o f these fixation effects. Further research might investigate more effective 
methods to achieve this end.
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APPENDIX A
Riddles and corresponding clue sentences from Experiments 1 and 2
The first three riddles are the filler materials. The fourth is the "bald" riddle that 
was used to  demonstrate the relationship between the sentences and the riddles.
Therefore, these four riddles were not included in the analyses reported in this dissertation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
Dan comes home from work and finds Charlie dead on the floor. On the floor is 
some broken glass and some water. Dan takes one look around and immediately knows 
how Charlie died. How did he die?
Charlie was a fish.
A criminal took his wife to a movie theater that was showing a shoot-em-up 
western. During one scene, when many guns were fired, he murdered his wife by shooting 
her in the head. He then took his wife's body out o f the theater, but no one stopped him. 
How did he manage it?
It was a drive-in movie.
Two train tracks run parallel except for a spot where they go under a tunnel. The 
tunnel is not wide enough to accommodate both tracks, so they become a single track for 
the distance o f the tunnel. One afternoon a train entered going one direction, and another 
train entered the same tunnel going the opposite direction. Both trains were going at top 
speed, yet there was no collision. Explain.
The trains entered at different times.
A man was caught in the rain with no hat or umbrella. There was nothing over his 
head and his clothes got soaked, but not a  hair on his head got wet. How is this possible?
A bald man does not have to dry his hair after taking a shower.
A man who lived in a small town in the U. S. married twenty different women o f 
the same town. All are still living and he has never divorced any o f them. Yet he has 
broken no law. Can you explain?
A minister marries several people each week.
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Whenever my aunt comes to  visit me at my apartment, she always gets off the 
elevator five floors beneath my floor. She then walks up the stairway to my apartment. 
Can you tell me why?
The top buttons on an elevator are too high for a midget to  reach.
A wine bottle is half-filled and corked. How can you drink all o f the wine without 
removing the cork from the bottle?
A cork can be opened by pulling it out or pushing it in.
Can you make a tennis ball go a short distance, come to a  dead stop, then reverse 
itself and go in the opposite direction? Note: Bouncing the ball is not permitted, nor can 
you hit it with anything, nor tie it to anything
If you throw a ball into the air, it comes back down.
The Great Sol Loony announced that on a certain day, at a certain time, he would 
perform a great miracle. He would walk for twenty minutes on the surface o f the Hudson 
River without sinking into the water. A big crowd gathered to witness the event. The 
Reverend Sol Loony did exactly what he said he would do. How did he manage to walk 
on the surface o f the river without sinking?
A person walking on frozen water will not fall through.
If you had only one match and you wanted to light a kerosene lamp, an oil heater, 
or a wood burning stove, which would you light first?
You must first light a match before you can light a fire.
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Why are 1987 dollar bills worth more than 1986 dollar bills?
1,850 dollar bills are worth more than 1,849 dollar bills.
One night my uncle was reading an exciting book when his wife turned out the 
light. Even though the room was pitch dark, he continued to read. How could he do 
that?
A blind person can read Braille in the dark.
Uriah Fuller, the famous superpsychic, can tell you the score o f any baseball game 
before the game starts. What is his secret?
Before any game is played, there is no score.
This morning, one o f my earrings fell into my coffee. Even though my cup was 
full, the earring didn't get wet. How come?
You add hot water to  ground beans to make coffee.
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APPENDIX B
RAT items from Experiment 3
RAT test items are in upper case, distractors are in lower case, and solutions are in boldface.
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13. RIVER NOTE BLOOD
lake music wound
14. FOOD CATCHER HOT
eat pitcher cold
15. HEARTED FEET BITTER
broken inches sweet
16. SANDWICH GOLF CANADIAN
jelly course Montreal
17. GRAVY SHOW TUG
potato movie pull
18 . ARM COAL PEACH
leg furnace pear








RAT items from Experiment 4, helpful conditions
RAT test items are in upper case, distractors are in lower case, and solutions are in boldface.
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Problems Solutions
1. LICK SPRINKLE MINES salt
tongue rain gold
2. TYPE GHOST STORY writer
style goblin tale
3. SURPRISE LINE BIRTHDAY party
trick angle cake
4. WHEEL ELECTRIC HIGH chair
tire cord low
5. CAT SLEEP BOARD walk
nap might wood
6. BALL STORM MAN snow
soccer tornado boy
7. WORM SCOTCH RED tape
bug whiskey green
8. FOOD CATCHER HOT dog
eat pitcher cold
9. HEARTED FEET BITTER cold
broken inches sweet
10. SANDWICH GOLF CANADIAN club
jelly course Montreal
11. GRAVY SHOW TUG boat
potato movie pull
12. ARM COAL PEACH Pit
leg furnace pear
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13. PASTE BUCK FAIRY
glue deer pixie
14. FINGER OIL BRUSH
hand olive comb
15. FLAG NORTH VAULT
banner south tomb
16. WIDOW BITE MONKEY
black chew wrench
17. CRAWL OUTER SHIP
storage floor ocean
18. APPLE HOUSE FAMILY
branch home mother
19 SKATE PICK WATER
blade choose bath
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APPENDIX C.2
RAT items from Experiment 4, distracting conditions
RAT test items are in upper case, distractors are in lower case, and solutions are in boldface.
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Problems Solutions
1. LICK SPRINKLE MINES salt
tongue rain gold
2. TYPE GHOST STORY w riter
style goblin tale
3. SURPRISE LINE BIRTHDAY party
trick angle cake
4. WHEEL ELECTRIC HIGH chair
tire cord low
5. CAT SLEEP BOARD walk
nap might wood
6. BALL STORM MAN snow
soccer tornado boy
7. WORM SCOTCH RED tape
bug whiskey green
8. FOOD CATCHER HOT dog
eat pitcher cold
9. HEARTED FEET BITTER cold
broken inches sweet
10. SANDWICH GOLF CANADIAN club
jelly course Montreal
11. GRAVY SHOW TUG boat
potato movie pull
12. ARM COAL PEACH pit
leg furnace pear
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13. PASTE BUCK FAIRY
glue deer pixie
14. FINGER OIL BRUSH
hand olive comb
15. FLAG NORTH VAULT
banner south tomb
16. WIDOW BITE MONKEY
woman chew wrench
17. CRAWL OUTER SHIP
floor floor ocean
18. APPLE HOUSE FAMILY
pie home mother
19 SKATE PICK WATER
board choose bath
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